THE MONTH OF MUFFLED DRUMS 225Reagan in his eyes was ‘a class enemy’ who had demonstrated his
‘extraordinary primitivism, troglodytic profile and intellectual incap-
acity’. Gorbachëv saw the American administration as full of ‘people
without conscience, without morality’. He resented their assumption
that he was pushing for an agreement only because of troubles in the
Soviet economy. He aimed to teach them a lesson: ‘They don’t know
what we’ll do as a reply to SDI.’ Nevertheless he remained ‘an even
bigger optimist’ after Iceland. He clung to his tactic of requiring the
Americans to accept a comprehensive ‘package’. He drew confidence
from how he had seized the initiative in the global media – and he
looked forward to attracting support from Western Europe as well as
from the anti-war movement and the neutral countries.^24 The Polit-
buro liked what it heard. The only cautionary note was sounded when
Zaikov asked Gorbachëv to announce the leadership’s undiminished
support for the defence industries. Gorbachëv welcomed Zaikov’s
request. Ligachëv applauded Gorbachëv’s success in appealing over the
heads of Western political leaders to entire peoples. Even Gromyko
and Chebrikov approved as the Politburo endorsed Gorbachëv’s
general conclusions.^25
Shevardnadze left for Bucharest to report to the Warsaw Pact’s
other foreign ministers. He divulged nothing of his personal reser-
vations about Gorbachëv’s tactics;^26 and when talking to his aides, he
heaped the blame on to Akhromeev. He told them that the Chief of
the General Staff had ‘betrayed’ the Soviet leadership by working with
Perle to obstruct the pathway to the ‘compromise’.^27 But really he
understood all too well that the problems had arisen from Gorbachëv’s
insistence on bargaining for a single comprehensive package. He hated
how the question of general disarmament had become ‘hostage’ to the
Strategic Defense Initiative. But Gorbachëv was the General Secretary,
and Shevardnadze knew he had to operate inside the framework that
he imposed.^28 But how had Akhromeev come to exert such influence?
Adamishin, who had his ear to the ground in the Foreign Affairs
Ministry, argued that Gorbachëv had been reluctant to drive his mili-
tary commanders too hard. He seemed to feel the need to carry them
along with him. While appreciating the difficulty, Adamishin judged
that the General Secretary had fumbled the chance that presented
itself: ‘His one defect is that he allows himself to be distracted. He was
distracted in Reykjavik. He went after the big bird in the sky, forgetting
the smaller one in his hands.’^29
Gorbachëv and Shevardnadze could at least agree that they should