226 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
not mark time after Reykjavik. Ambassador Dubinin talked to Shultz
on 14 October 1986. He passed on greetings from Gorbachëv and She-
vardnadze, to whom he had spoken after the close of the summit.
Gorbachëv wanted Shultz to know that he was pleased about the ‘good
atmospherics’ and ‘real progress’ in Iceland. Dubinin’s instructions
were to discover the reasons why Reagan had objected to the idea of
confining testing to laboratories – he was to explain that Gorbachëv
believed that this was a concession that would permit the Americans
to conduct all the research they craved. Soviet and American leaders
would then have years to work out an agreement that both sides would
find acceptable. Gorbachëv was willing to expand the definition of
laboratory so as to include test ranges. His one big proviso was that the
Americans would be barred from carrying out tests in outer space. His
message to Shultz was that he had shown a flexibility on this question
that should have enabled an agreement in Iceland. He hoped that
Reagan and his officials would now recognize the genuineness of his
offer. Dubinin tried to kick-start the renewal of negotiations by asking
when Shevardnadze could meet Shultz again.^30
Gorbachëv wanted to continue to make it difficult for the White
House to reject his overtures. He felt sharp frustration about how
Reagan and his officials kept quiet about the Soviet offer to allow
laboratory research on space defence.^31 He hoped to nudge the West
Europeans into bearing down on Reagan. With this in mind, he con-
templated making trips to London and Paris. Shevardnadze too ought
to go on a European tour. Everything should be tried to render the
Strategic Defense Initiative less of a threat for the USSR.^32 It turned out
that Gorbachëv’s work schedule made it impossible for him to leave
Moscow that winter. But Shevardnadze was able to visit Vienna, where
he held discussions with NATO leaders. On 4 November 1986 he
implored British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe to recognize how
far Gorbachëv had moved towards compromise on the Defense Initia-
tive.^33 Shevardnadze was loyally fulfilling official policy.^34 Privately he
was urging Gorbachëv to change tactics. Something else had to be
tried – and the sooner, the better.
One of the factors holding back Gorbachëv was his sense that he
had to keep the general staff onside. He knew that Akhromeev had
trouble of his own after Reykjavik. Whereas the Politburo found him a
stern defender of military prerogatives, his fellow commanders felt
that he made too many compromises. He was navigating a passage
between Scylla and Charybdis. Matters came to a head when he gave a