THE MONTH OF MUFFLED DRUMS 227lecture to the General Staff Academy and proposed a new military
doctrine for the USSR. He made the case for both superpowers to shift
their emphasis towards defensive strategic planning. The priority
should be to prevent war of any kind. Akhromeev stunned the
Academy by renouncing the traditional notion of immediate, all-out
retaliation to an American attack and advocating the case for defen-
sive operations that might last for several weeks. Only if this failed
would he approve a nuclear offensive against American cities.^35 Akhro-
meev was turning Soviet military doctrine upside down. There was
total silence during the lecture. But as soon as he finished, he experi-
enced a barrage of criticism for two long hours. Opinion in the officer
corps was almost universally hostile. Akhromeev recognized that if he
was going to remain an effective Chief of the General Staff, he had to
bring Academy personnel into his drafting team.^36
He had never been an untroubled reformer. But he recognized that
times had changed and that the political leadership would no longer
allow the freedom that the armed forces had enjoyed before 1985.
He thought that he could get more for them by bargaining with
Gorbachëv rather than treating him as an adversary.
This meant that the tension between Politburo and General Staff
was going to continue. Each knew about the game that the other was
playing. Strains were also growing inside the Politburo as its members
digested the reports on Reykjavik. On 30 October 1986 Gromyko,
veteran of countless summits, made his first criticism since departing
from the Foreign Affairs Ministry. He had no objection to the goal
of an arms reduction agreement but called for a clear definition of
‘lab oratory’ research and testing for the Strategic Defense Initiative.
Gromyko implied a fear the Americans might run rings around Gor-
bachëv. This stung Gorbachëv into replying: ‘So what is to be done?
Should we break off the talks?’ Gromyko refused to back down and
argued the need to cease negotiating on the basis of an all-or-nothing
package. Gorbachëv clung single-mindedly to his tactics. He also saw
his personal contribution as crucial: ‘Nothing is going to be resolved
in Geneva. That is garbage!’^37 Summits in his opinion were the sole key
to progress. He desired to attract West European governments to a
joint campaign against the Defense Initiative in the years before it
became deployable. Meanwhile, he suggested, the USSR had to look as
if it was negotiating from a position of strength.^38
The problem, as the entire Politburo had known for a long time,
was that the USSR’s economy faced grave difficulties. Gorbachëv had