228 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
pretended the opposite to Reagan, but when talking to Soviet minis-
ters, he admitted that the budget still relied excessively on oil and gas
exports and that technological progress and labour productivity were
chronically poor.^39 Drastic reform, he contended, was overdue. He
told them that no approval would now be given for big new projects.
There could also be no increase in wages. His only proviso was that
retail prices should be held steady at a time when society had yet to
receive material benefit from perestroika. And what if Eastern Europe
and other socialist countries pleaded for assistance? Gorbachëv was
emphatic: ‘No promises to anyone, however much they ask.’^40
Reagan could see no advantage in relaxing his stance. Poindexter
supported him, taking note of the hints dropped by Dubinin that there
might be some ‘give’ in the Soviet bargaining position.^41 The President
waited on events. He reckoned that if America were to offer con-
cessions, the USSR would simply pocket them without giving anything
of importance in return. He felt that the Kremlin was at last beginning
to confront its problems – the Iceland talks had revealed that Soviet
leaders recognized their need to integrate the USSR into the world
economy. America, he sensed, had the upper hand. Reagan’s idea was
to keep the initiative by modernizing the American forces and sustain-
ing work on the Defense Initiative. Soviet politics were in enormous
flux. The White House had to be ready for the possibility that
Gorbachëv might suddenly crumble in the face of American demands.
Reagan ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare a contingency
scheme under the direction of the Defense Department; he demanded
a progress report by December 1986. He also instructed the CIA to
keep a lookout for any new shifts in the Politburo’s policies.^42 He
meant to prevent Gorbachëv from setting the negotiating framework.
If the Kremlin leaders wanted an arms reduction treaty with America,
they would have to meet his basic requirements. He confirmed the list
of the quotas and categories of weapons that the joint working groups
had agreed in Reykjavik. He was intent on holding the Soviet side to
the compromises they had made.^43
As Reagan waited for his pressure to have its effect, his administra-
tion tumbled back into its internal disputes. Weinberger did not like
what he heard about the Iceland discussion and tried to toughen
America’s stance in the weeks that followed. Weinberger objected to
any idea that the American delegation in the Geneva talks should
negotiate a definition of what was permitted under the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty. He demanded complete freedom for work on the