230 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
Shultz’s proposals were a delayed reaction to the three-stage
scheme that Gorbachëv had announced in January 1986. There was
little support for them in the White House – and not just on the part
of Weinberger and Casey. Perhaps there was a recognition among
those who wanted to renew the negotiating process that the Politburo
would reject the proposals. At best, they would make good propa-
ganda. The demand for freedom of information, expression and travel
was entirely justifiable but unrealistic at that moment: it was tanta-
mount to calling on the Soviet leaders to decommunize their country.
The changing political scene complicated the tasks of the Ameri-
can administration. On 4 November 1986, elections gave victory to the
Democrats, and the Republicans lost control of the Senate. This was
not quite the disaster it seemed for Reagan’s prospects in foreign
policy because the Republican Party contained the most acidic oppo-
nents of conciliation with the USSR. But Reagan had to continue to
thwart Gorbachëv’s efforts to appeal to the Democratic senators as the
world’s great peacemaker. Shultz made yet another attempt to restart
the momentum of talks with Soviet leaders. He advised a campaign to
highlight the Kremlin’s abuse of human rights. At the same time he
warned of the need to recognize the growing concerns about Ameri-
can foreign policy in NATO. London, Paris and Bonn may have
declared support for how America was handling the USSR, but in
private they expressed apprehension whenever Reagan talked to
Gorbachëv about doing away with all nuclear missiles. Thatcher unre-
mittingly drew attention to the dangers involved. The removal of
nuclear missiles would leave Western Europe exposed to the USSR’s
enormous superiority in conventional forces. The military menace
from the East would not disappear but increase. Shultz recognized the
strength of these arguments. He told Reagan of the urgent need to
work up proposals that would prevent Gorbachëv from driving a
wedge into the middle of NATO.^49
The West European leaders were not the only people who were
disconcerted about the President’s policies. Many of his own officials
thought that he was risking too much. Weinberger and Casey agreed
with the arguments that Thatcher was making. They were not alone.
Poindexter had always believed it would be disastrous to eliminate
nuclear weaponry; he believed in mutually assured destruction as the
best way to keep world peace. Nitze was in favour of resuming talks
with the USSR but feared that Gorbachëv wanted to get rid of nuclear
weapons solely in order to put Western Europe at the mercy of Soviet