THE MONTH OF MUFFLED DRUMS 231tanks and troops. European experts in the State Department too saw
that the Reykjavik proceedings would agitate America’s allies –
Rozanne Ridgway was only half-joking when she said: ‘A lot of people
are starting to love the bomb.’^50 Reagan received a warning that the
Joint Chiefs of Staff were like to demand an increase in the military
budget: if the President wanted to reduce the nuclear weapon stock-
piles, the army would inevitably ask for extra divisions for its con-
ventional forces.^51 Shultz agreed that a new military plan was essential
after Iceland. He proposed a diminution of state welfare provision so
as to meet the costs of his suggestions.^52
Reagan made no reply, and the question about how to pay for the
consequences of nuclear disarmament was left dangling in the air.^53
One thing was fixed in his mind: the desire to end reliance on mutu-
ally assured destruction. Global affairs had to rest on a different basis.
On this, Reagan never wavered.