236 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
his abiding priority to guarantee American military preparedness and
pursue the Strategic Defense Initiative.^1
On 28 November 1986 American critics felt justified in their con-
cerns when Reagan sanctioned the deployment of an extra B-52 bomber
equipped with cruise missiles. This was one more than the SALT-II
treaty appeared to permit, and there was a risk of a breakdown of talks
with the USSR. Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Bessmert-
nykh prepared a diplomatic note to the effect that the Soviet Union no
longer felt constrained by its treaty obligations. He received support
from others in the ministry as well as from Kornienko and Akhro-
meev. Expert analysis, however, showed that the Americans had
probably committed no infringement if Soviet submarines were taken
into account. Kataev in the Party Defence Department suggested that
Reagan was trying to wrong-foot the USSR by provoking a hostile
reaction – he passed on his thinking to Shevardnadze and Zaikov in
advance of a decision by the Politburo.^2
Gorbachëv listened to both sides of the argument. Bessmertnykh
was furious about the Americans: ‘And so, do we have to look on this
quietly? We’ll show them! . . .’ The General Staff was of the same opin-
ion and signalled a desire to revert to expanding the Soviet nuclear
arsenal if America should continue with its current approach.^3 But
Kataev won the day. Gorbachëv wanted to avoid doing anything pre-
cipitate and claimed that a wild démarche was only to be expected
from Reagan at a time when he needed to distract attention from the
Iran-Contra scandal and restore his authority. Gorbachëv thought
the President’s decision was ‘destructive’ and out of keeping with the
understandings achieved in Reykjavik. Gorbachëv thought the Ameri-
cans might now undertake yet another military ‘adventure’, perhaps
against Nicaragua or Syria. He reasoned that the Soviet leadership
should make a sharp objection but continue to attend the Geneva
talks. He hoped to use propaganda to shape American and European
public opinion. (Endearingly, he commented that the Soviet Life mag-
azine had an impact in America that worried the FBI. Who on earth
was feeding him this nonsense?)^4 The Politburo endorsed his measured
response to the B-52 deployment, and Shevardnadze undertook to
persuade the Americans to adhere to the SALT-II treaty.^5
One way to outflank Reagan, Gorbachëv said, was to hold an
international conference on human rights in Moscow. Having freed
Andrei Sakharov from administrative exile in Gorki, he wanted
approval for a set of further steps. Gorbachëv asked why, when some-