260 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
it became a bestseller. Its contents laid a stress on the commitment to
democratization. He insisted that perestroika offered a fresh way of
organizing societies; he wanted to chart a course between capitalism
and Stalinist communism. Gorbachëv depicted his own reforms of the
Soviet order as offering the best way of life for all humankind.^15
While Gorbachëv’s popularity soared around the world, dissatis-
faction lingered in Washington about the CIA’s performance. The Joint
Economic Committee of Congress held hearings in April 1988 about
concerns that the CIA had persistently overstated the USSR’s eco-
nomic performance. Douglas J. MacEachin, who headed the Office of
Soviet Analysis, countered that his officials had constantly under-
scored Moscow’s economic problems and pointed to the chronic
failure to develop and absorb new civilian technology.^16 Soviet com-
puting power was reported a mere tenth of America’s.^17 The agency
also estimated that military requirements constituted fifteen to seven-
teen per cent of the USSR’s state budget. (At a dinner that Senator
Edward Kennedy gave for him, Shevardnadze put it even higher at
eighteen per cent!)^18 In the CIA’s opinion, Gorbachëv had yet to make
the necessary choice between economic reform and strategic weapons
modernization – and all this time the Soviet external debt was on the
increase.^19 MacEachin, writing to Deputy Director of Intelligence
Richard Kerr, stressed his confidence that immense strains were grow-
ing in Soviet politics and society. He was frank about the limits to
what was knowable about Kremlin discussions; he also revealed that
CIA experts were divided about whether Gorbachëv could prevent a
coup against himself and his reforms, perhaps led by Ligachëv or
Chebrikov. Nevertheless, all officials agreed that there was a growing
crisis in the USSR.^20
Casey also had his agency behind him in sounding the alarm
about Soviet industrial espionage in America. He attributed the USSR’s
technological progress largely to this source.^21 He was not the only one
to emphasize Moscow’s dependence on its spy network. The KGB did
the same in its confidential reports to the Politburo, and its Chairman,
Chebrikov, and his successor, Kryuchkov, boasted about their agency’s
prowess in stealing secrets from American factories and laboratories.^22
Shultz had never believed in the impartiality of CIA reports on a
wider front. He saw a chance to impose himself from mid-December
1986 when a brain tumour forced Casey’s abstention from active work
and Gates became acting director.^23 Shultz invited Gates for talks in
the State Department soon after New Year. Forgoing any pleasantries,