GETTING TO KNOW THE ENEMY 269Gorbachëv. Reagan’s right-wing critics thought that the President was
revealing himself as a political fool or romantic. They contended that
he had sold out his principles. But they missed the point. Reagan had
not changed his standpoint on the USSR. What had happened was a
sequence of basic changes at the apex of the Soviet leadership. Reagan
was greeting the process with delight and understanding and trying to
facilitate it from the American side.
As Gorbachëv contemplated radical reforms of the Soviet political
system, he adduced America as an example to follow. Candidates
for high office ought to be properly scrutinized: ‘Just look at how in
the American Congress they pick to pieces every minister that the
President wants to appoint. What a contrast with us: who ever asks a
question or coordinates with a Supreme Soviet Commission as to
whom to appoint as a minister? We just read in the newspaper that
so-and-so has been appointed to such-and-such a post; but who is it,
where’s he come from, why?’^72
Shevardnadze admired how the Eurocommunists had revised
their Marxism and tossed aside dogma about the working class and its
leading political role.^73 He had his own second thoughts about the
history of his native Georgia. Until 1921, when the Red Army invaded,
the Georgians had been governed by Noi Zhordania and the Menshe-
viks. Although the Mensheviks were Marxists, their policies were less
violent and impatient than those of Lenin and Trotsky in Moscow.
Shevardnadze recognized ‘healthy ideas’ in Menshevism and grew
sceptical about the tenets of Marxism-Leninism.^74 In the contempo-
rary world he esteemed the political leaders of New Zealand and
Denmark for their ‘courage’ and skill in keeping the support of their
peoples.^75 This was an extraordinary attitude for a Soviet leader. Shun-
ning the hauteur of a great-power statesman, he looked for inspiration
to politicians of smaller countries who emphasized peace and recon-
ciliation; and when speaking to Japanese Prime Minister Takeshita,
he attributed Japan’s post-war economic success to its abandonment
of militarism. The USSR’s establishment of a ‘closed society’, he con-
cluded, had led to its failure.^76
On a visit to Japan in January 1986, Shevardnadze felt envious
of the products of their technology and was impressed by the consid-
eration shown to the labour force.^77 Despite coming from the land
of proletarian revolution, he acknowledged that the Nissan factory
workers enjoyed better treatment than was available in the USSR;
he was also impressed by their cooperativeness with the managers.^78