STICKING POINTS 277when writing to the President in September, he warned yet again
against initiating a new arms race in outer space; but he omitted direct
mention of the Strategic Defense Initiative.^15
Shultz noticed this nuance and alerted Reagan to its meaning.^16
The French noticed that while Gorbachëv continued to protest about
the American programme, he usually did this only in passing.^17 The
Defense Initiative remained on the sidelines at the Washington
summit in December 1987. Frank Carlucci, appointed as Defense
Secretary a week earlier, welcomed Akhromeev to the Pentagon – an
extraordinary occasion for the USSR’s Chief of the General Staff.
Akhromeev also made the acquaintance of General Abrahamson, the
director of the Strategic Defense Initiative. Carlucci proposed a recip-
rocal programme of visits to research stations; he suggested that Soviet
experts should look over the facilities at Stanford University and at the
Livermore National Laboratory in California. Akhromeev did not
deny that Soviet scientists were working on a rival research pro-
gramme. When Carlucci described the Initiative as unstoppable,
Akhromeev asked him to appreciate that the USSR would eventually
- even if it took fifteen years or more – develop a system to counteract
the American project. Velikhov was the only serious scientist taking
part in the discussion, and he queried the potential of American laser
technology to achieve its projected results; he voiced his doubts that
the researchers were supplying the politicians in Washington with
trustworthy information.^18
The ripples of Gorbachëv’s newly felt reluctance to make a bug-
aboo of the Defense Initiative had an immediate effect on public
discourse. Politburo members, Akhromeev noted, gave up talking
about the Initiative even among themselves.^19
Soviet leaders made no announcement about their tactical shift.
Perhaps they reasoned that there was no advantage in dropping a bar-
gaining card without getting something in return. Possibly they also
feared a loss of global prestige through a display of weakness. But
though they never ceased to nag about the Defense Initiative, their
change of stance was definite. Later when the Big Five met on 2 March
1988, Zaikov confirmed that it was no longer official policy to insist
on a link between the Initiative and the other questions of military dis-
armament.^20 The problem was that nobody informed the Americans.
Wanting progress in the talks about medium-range nuclear missiles,
America’s negotiators sketched out their ideas about a ‘test range in
space’. The intention was to prove a willingness to consider some