STICKING POINTS 279took time to have an effect. In summer 1987 the Politburo tried to cool
the dispute by inviting a group of American congressmen to inspect
the Krasnoyarsk site. The idea of welcoming foreigners inside the
perimeter of a military ‘object’ in the USSR was unprecedented. Gor-
bachëv was showing extraordinary flexibility. But the enterprise
disappointed him because the visitors refused to abandon their oppo-
sition except insofar as they agreed that the Soviet authorities would
not be in breach of the treaty until such time as they activated the
station.^27
On 15 September, on his trip to Washington, Shevardnadze faced
further criticism at the White House from Reagan and his officials.^28
He suggested that the only way forward would be for each side to lean
on its own defence establishment; he added that he had questioned
Yazov about the disputed status of the radar station. He wanted to
appear adaptable. But he offered no practical solution, and Reagan
simply repeated his demand for the Soviet leadership to dismantle the
facilities or else put the current round of arms reduction talks in jeop-
ardy.^29 Shevardnadze’s directives from Moscow did not allow him to
reveal that the Politburo on 4 September had tentatively decided on a
moratorium on the Krasnoyarsk building work; he was meant to use
his trip only to gauge the strength of hostility.^30 Reagan and Wein-
berger left no room for ambiguity. That same October, on hearing
Shevardnadze’s report, Gorbachëv announced a one-year morator-
ium.^31 This took some heat out of the dispute for a while; and Reagan
unusually said nothing about Krasnoyarsk at the December 1987
summit.
As Soviet leaders prepared for Shultz’s Moscow visit in February
1988, the Big Five proposed that Shevardnadze should offer to put the
station out of commission for the next ten years so long as the Ameri-
cans agreed to dismantle their ‘illegal’ installations in Thule and
Fylingdales.^32 This made no difference to Reagan. On 12 August 1988
he wrote to Gorbachëv explaining that America’s entire political estab-
lishment saw the case for removing the Krasnoyarsk complex as
non-negotiable. He and the Congress were in complete agreement. If
Gorbachëv wanted a treaty on strategic nuclear weapons, he had to
dismantle the facilities.^33 Gorbachëv went to Krasnoyarsk in Septem-
ber and floated the idea of handing over the station to the Academy of
Sciences and establishing a centre for international cooperation for the
peaceful use of outer space. He wrote to the White House to explain
his scheme.^34 Reagan, Shultz and Bush briskly rejected it. (For once,