STICKING POINTS 281Gorbachëv.^44 Akhromeev could see that it was futile to object. Gor-
bachëv referred everyone to Thatcher’s remark that the West had a
genuine fear of the USSR after its invasions of Hungary, Czechoslo-
vakia and Afghanistan. He reasoned that Soviet policy had to take this
seriously into account. Calling loftily for the ‘humanization’ of inter-
national relations, he demanded a change in military doctrine from
parity to sufficiency – and he wanted to reduce armaments to ‘the
lowest level’. If the arms race continued, the Soviet Union would have
to be ‘a military camp’. Disarmament was the only realistic alternative.
Gorbachëv talked of decreasing the USSR’s military strength in East-
ern Europe to 170,000 soldiers and inducing America to withdraw its
forces back across the Atlantic.^45
In July Shevardnadze added that if he was expected to represent
the country effectively abroad, the leadership had to be less secretive.
Government, military-industrial agencies, army and KGB were invited
to give an opinion on this demand.^46 Although Ryzhkov voiced no
objection, he doubted the feasibility of satisfying Shevardnadze’s
demands before the tax-year 1989–1990.^47 On 6 August the Politburo
accepted this schedule.^48
Meanwhile it remained the official claim that military expenditure
was only 4.6 per cent of total state expenditure.^49 Yakovlev recalled a
remarkable conversation on the subject:
There was once, I remember, when Zaikov phoned me: ‘Listen,
Alexander, have you any idea how many warheads we have?’ I say:
‘Well, I suppose it’s about thirty-nine thousand.’ ‘No,’ he says, ‘it’s
really forty-three.’ I say: ‘Where did you get that from? We have
thirty-nine in all our documents.’ He says: ‘But I’ve been searching
for one of the bosses in the Defence Ministry and there was
nobody to be found. In the end we got hold of one, a boss from
the rear armed forces. I asked him how many warheads we have
there. He says: “Forty-three thousand.”’ This is how we’ve been
deceived on other types of weaponry as well. Well, to hell with
them.^50Even Akhromeev, no enthusiast for the ending of secrecy, admitted
that something was wrong: ‘Well, you understand that any Supreme
Soviet deputy can ask our General Secretary how we with so small a
military budget can stand up to the USA with so huge a military
budget. And here’s us saying that we do everything on the basis of
parity [with the Americans]. Who’s going to believe us?’^51 The KGB’s