282 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
Chebrikov commented that if Soviet analysts could learn so much
from open sources about what went on at California’s Los Alamos and
Livermore nuclear test bases, the Americans should be allowed to
inspect Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan.^52
Years of obfuscation had to be surmounted. It transpired that the
traditional budget specified only expenditure on military personnel.
Research and production were hidden under misleading headings.
Vadim Medvedev was to recall that four or five individuals alone
received data on the true costs. As the reform of account-keeping pro-
ceeded, it emerged the armed forces cost not five but at least sixteen
per cent of the state’s financial burden – and Medvedev guessed that
the real figure was around twenty-five per cent.^53
Arms talks with the Americans were hindered by spurious official
claims about Soviet nuclear stockpiles. The truth, as Shevardnadze
explained to his inner circle on 9 November 1987, was that the USSR
had more intermediate-range rockets than America: ‘An imbalance
exists, that’s something we know. But it’s not something we publicly
acknowledge.’^54 Akhromeev could no longer resist the force of such
arguments. When negotiations were resumed in Washington on
24 November, Shultz and Shevardnadze felt able to leave it to Nitze
and Akhromeev to resolve some important particulars. Akhromeev
yielded on inspections once Nitze agreed to limit them to six a year.
But he objected to the American reluctance to let his inspectors into
a Utah weapons factory. When he called for an examination of the
Martin Marietta factory in Orlando, Florida, Shultz exclaimed: ‘That’s
Disneyland!’ Nitze added that Martin Marietta no longer produced
arma ments. Colin Powell intervened and contradicted Nitze.^55 For
the agreement to work, both sides needed to sharpen their efforts.
The preparations intensified. By February 1988 the Soviet side was
getting ready for the arrival of American inspectors at the Votkinsk
instal lation in the southern Urals.^56 In May Shevardnadze gave a
detailed report to Shultz on the number of Soviet strategic nuclear
weapons. Since it was in Russian, it was incomprehensible to Shultz;
but he showed his appreciation of the signs of progress.^57
Gorbachëv and Reagan had concentrated on long- and medi-
um-range weapons at their Reykjavik summit and left short-range
missiles for their working groups to handle. Much remained to be
done, and the leaders knew they would have to deal with the matter
sooner or later. Short range was defined as any distance up to 500 kilo-
metres. The American and Soviet sides were acutely aware that a single