STICKING POINTS 283so-called operational-tactical nuclear missile fired from just over the
line between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would start a world war.
On 2 February 1987 Gorbachëv proposed to add such missiles to the
intermediate-range ones for removal from Europe.^58 His priority was
to remove all barriers to agreement with the Americans.
While the American negotiators agreed on this as an objective,
they worried about the time that it might take to attain it. Indeed, they
called Soviet sincerity into question. Their grounds for suspicion were
the USSR’s installation of its new SS-23 (‘Oka’) missiles in the German
Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia. According to the designers,
these missiles could cover a maximum distance of 400 kilometres
and was therefore a short-range nuclear weapon. The American side
expressed their concern that a way could be found to increase the
range and secretly get round the projected agreement on medium-
range missiles. In fact it was technically unfeasible to extend the range;
but the USSR’s negotiating team was forbidden from divulging this
information for fear of revealing the secrets of the research. Everyone
could see that the Americans had some justification in the light
of the publicly available information. Shevardnadze was for simply
stopping production and deployment whereas Akhromeev suggested
modifying the SS-23s in such a way as to shorten their range. Akhro-
meev was being helpful after a fashion. But Zaikov realized that
Akhromeev’s proposal would still fail to satisfy the Americans. Shultz
would be soon arriving in Moscow and would certainly create trouble
unless the Soviet leadership gave way.^59
Gorbachëv gave his word to Shultz that the USSR would eliminate
the SS-23s – he agreed with Zaikov on the need for a quick resolution
in order to secure the signature of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty. He claimed to have had Akhromeev with him at the
time. Akhromeev later denied having been present at the precise
moment when Gorbachëv made his concession.^60 What is more, gossip
spread round Moscow that Shevardnadze had pushed Gorbachëv into
making a concession that damaged the USSR’s interests. There was
disquiet in the Ministry of Defence and the Military-Political Com-
mission. When Varennikov arrived on a trip from Kabul, he made
straight for Akhromeev’s office. Akhromeev did not even say hello but
immediately stated: ‘Valentin Ivanovich, it’s not me who’s at fault.
What happened was that the order was given “up there”.’ Varennikov
had not had time to mention the SS-23s, but Akhromeev could easily
guess what was on his mind.^61 Gorbachëv stuck by his promise and