26. GRINDING OUT THE TREATY
On 8 September 1987 America’s National Security Planning Group
gathered to prepare for the next of Shevardnadze’s visits to Washing-
ton. Excitement mounted about opportunities to achieve agreement
on strategic as well as intermediate-range nuclear weapons before the
end of Reagan’s presidential term.^1 Shultz, usually an optimist, deemed
this premature at a time when the two sides had yet to sign any kind
of fundamental agreement, but he applauded the progress that the
American delegation was making in Geneva: ‘We need to make de -
cisions and get the treaty on the table before Shevardnadze gets here.’^2
His comments agitated Weinberger, who warned against ‘reaching
quick decisions under the pressure of a meeting’. Shultz declined to
contest the point, explaining that he had information to the effect that
the Planning Group had been leaking like a sieve. If the day’s proceed-
ings were to become public knowledge, he contended, complications
could arise in negotiations with the USSR.^3 Weinberger bridled at the
comment. He also objected to Shultz’s request to authorize a degree of
flexibility for American negotiators in the talks on strategic forces. In
Weinberger’s opinion, the Secretary of State was prescribing a ration-
ale for nothing less than surrender to the Kremlin.^4
Reagan did what came naturally to him by staying out of the dis-
pute between State and Defence. But he none the less revealed where
his sympathies lay:
You’ve got to remember that the whole thing [about the negotia-
tions] was born of the idea that the world needs to get rid of
nuclear weapons. We’ve got to remember that we can’t win a
nuclear war and we can’t fight one. The Soviets don’t want to win
by war but by threat of war. They want to issue ultimatums to
which we have to give in. If we could just talk about the basic steps
we need to take to break the log jam and avoid the possibility of
war. I mean, just think about it. Where would the survivors of the
war live? Major areas of the world would be uninhabitable. We