The End of the Cold War. 1985-1991

286 THE END OF THE COLD WAR

need to keep it in mind that that’s what we’re about. We’re about

bringing together steps to bring us closer to the recognition that

we need to do away with nuclear weapons.^5

As if sensing that this sounded like the call of a political dove, he
added: ‘I have a friend who tells me that in the Soviet Union their
right-wingers are starting to call Gorbachëv “Mr Yes” because he
agrees with everything I propose.’^6
Weinberger, sensing that the President was anaesthetizing his own
old ideas, sought to revive suspicion of the USSR’s policies past and
present. He spoke like a schoolmaster correcting a disappointing
pupil:

We have to be very careful on this area, Mr President, because

what we want to do is get rid of nuclear weapons and if we handle

this badly, we will not be able to get rid of them. We can’t live with

nuclear weapons if they are used. We can’t get rid of them because

there are no defences against them. We must do nothing to inhibit

our ability to defend against nuclear weapons. We need to defend

early; we need to defend our continent, not just a few sites.^7

According to the latest information, the Strategic Defense Initiative
was not going to be ready for deployment until 1995. There was a
danger in accepting the demands that Soviet negotiators were making.
Weinberger did not mind if arms talks were suspended for two years
or more. America had to demonstrate firmness.^8
Although Reagan mouthed yes to Weinberger, the punctilious
minutes-taker recorded that he was ‘basically shaking his head’. He
badly wanted to make a success of the talks. He made one short move
to placate Weinberger by promising that if America were to share the
Strategic Defense Initiative technology with the USSR, he would insist
on getting the same access to the new Soviet defence system. Wein-
berger remained unmoved: ‘I don’t believe we could ever do that.’
General Robert Herres, Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
agreed: ‘Mr President, there is a great risk in exchanging technical
data. Much of our technology is easily convertible into other purposes
and into an offensive area.’ Adelman added: ‘Mr President, that would
be the most massive technical transfer that the Western world has ever
known. We would make the Toshiba incident look piddling. If they
understood our system that well, it would be easy for them to move to
countermeasures.’^9
Kampelman said that people were missing the point. He said that