8 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
what they saw as his undue willingness to place his trust in the Krem-
lin.^11 Kohl and his Ten Points in favour of German reunification in
November 1989 had a very obvious impact on events. The question
arises about whether even he could have sustained his political
campaign unless he knew he could count on American support.
In addition, what in fluence is to be attributed to the pro-Gorbachëv
campaigns of both the ‘peace movement’ and most communist and
socialist parties in Western Europe?
Gorbachëv had an easier time with the Warsaw Pact than the
American Presidents had with NATO. Though the East European
party bosses felt disquiet about his attempt to reform the USSR, most
of them endorsed his relaxation of the tension with America. They
nevertheless became disorientated and confused as the communist
order’s difficulties grew in the 1980s.^12 But they did not leave power
voluntarily, and the pivotal factor in their fall was the bravery of the
activists and crowds who took to the streets. Gorbachëv refused to
sanction armed intervention to save communism. Few would deny
that his policy of encouraging people to stand up for their rights con-
tributed to the revolutions that overwhelmed the old leaderships. But
it is still left to ask why the events of the year 1989 caught him
so much by surprise – and to examine the impact they had on the
situation in Lithuania and other Baltic Soviet republics.^13 Indeed, his
entire global strategy continues to raise questions. No one can doubt
the importance of Soviet leaders’ decision to abandon almost all the
USSR’s toeholds in the Third World despite their continuing objection
to American global pretensions.^14 But they still call for further investi-
gation. World politics changed at astonishing pace, and each big or
little shift affected all the others. And almost without anyone noticing
it, the Soviet Union lost its superpower status.
The Cold War’s end was no pre-ordained process, but most
accounts do at least agree that it was possible at any time for America
and the USSR to relapse into their older postures of confrontation.
Reagan, had he so decided, could have refused to deal constructively
with the USSR. As an American conservative he had plenty of room
for complaint about Soviet policies. Gorbachëv himself could have
decided to halt or reverse his reforms. Many of those who had sup-
ported his appointment as General Secretary wanted him to do exactly
this – and eventually his own leading appointees turned on him in the
August 1991 coup. Enough of the communist system survived to have
made this a practicable alternative. Gorbachëv, propped up by fellow