288 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
Shevardnadze and Shultz got together later that day and agreed
about how to organize the working groups to draft the final details of
the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.^15 This pleased Shevard-
nadze, who thought it possible to proceed to a fifty per cent reduction
in strategic weapons. The USSR still had some good cards to play.
Shevardnadze reckoned that if Gorbachëv did not like what the White
House offered, he could still turn down the invitation to a Washington
summit meeting without loss of face.^16
On 17 September 1987 Shultz handed over a list of demands run-
ning to sixty pages. He pushed for rapid signature of the treaty.
Shevardnadze, who was suffering from insomnia, declined to be
rushed. Far too many questions remained unresolved. The pace needed
to slacken.^17 Shultz replied that if there was any delay, Soviet leaders
might have to negotiate with whoever became President after Reagan.
Better to finish things off quickly between the Soviet Union and Amer-
ica. Big arms reduction agreements were in reach. Shultz showed
annoyance when Shevardnadze continued to demur. Both agreed that
important details needed clarifying before the summit, but the Ameri-
cans worried that there was a lack of a sense of urgency in Moscow.^18
Shevardnadze for his part sought assurances that the conflict inside the
American establishment would quickly be resolved. The USSR did not
want to hold a signing ceremony in Washington, only to hear that the
American Congress refused to ratify the treaty. The Soviet leadership
was not going to put the reputation of its General Secretary in jeop-
ardy.^19 Shevardnadze wanted Shultz to appreciate that Gorbachëv and
the reformers faced a difficult situation at home. They simply could not
afford to appear as being too ready to yield on every matter of difficulty
in international relations.
The military lobby in the USSR continued to harp on the dangers.
The General Staff agreed with the official priority for a bilateral reduc-
tion in nuclear arms. The Americans and their allies worried that the
consequence could be to leave Soviet conventional forces in a position
to pose an insurmountable threat to Western Europe. (This was why
Akhromeev had left these forces out of his proposals in January 1986.)
Reagan lent urgency to military modernization. There was no let-up in
the process, and voices on the Soviet side expressed concern that
NATO would soon take a leap forward in its non-nuclear equipment.
The USSR was being outstripped.^20
On 14 October 1987 the US National Security Planning Group
drew pleasure from the fact that Soviet leaders no longer treated the