GRINDING OUT THE TREATY 289Strategic Defense Initiative as a barrier to a treaty. According to Kam-
pelman, they had learned ‘that they have to live with it’. Carlucci
explained: ‘That’s what Shevardnadze said to me during his visit.’^21
Reagan referred everyone to a film screened at Camp David that ‘really
refutes the scientific groupies that have it all wrong’. This boosted his
confidence about winning over the American public.^22 Weinberger
warned against undue compromise:
I want no restrictions. Any restriction on testing is too restrictive.
It’s just a scientific matter; you’re asking me not to think about
something. If we would have taken this attitude, we would never
have had the auto or the cinema industry. For example, Mr Presi-
dent, you’ll notice that on their list, the electromagnetic masked
accelerator is restricted to 1.2 grams per fathom. That’s certainly
too restrictive.^23His pernicketiness gave rise to some amusement.^24 He was evidently a
spent political force, as he increasingly recognized. The impetus from
the White House was in the direction of agreeing a treaty. Reagan
wanted the talks to succeed.
The President agreed for Shultz to fly to Moscow for discussions
about the remaining obstacles to a treaty. On 23 October Shultz met
with Gorbachëv to reaffirm that the Strategic Defense Initiative was
untouchable. Gorbachëv replied that if this was going to be the Ameri-
can attitude, there was no point in his crossing the Atlantic. Instead of
a Washington summit, he suggested an encounter with Reagan some-
where halfway between the two capitals.^25 He was obviously hoping
that a display of obduracy would force the Americans to give ground.^26
Gorbachëv had to think again when Shultz made clear that he was
not going to budge. His difficulty, as he knew that Shultz was aware,
was that he wanted a treaty as badly as did Reagan. This removed high
cards from his bargaining hand. Without further fuss he dropped the
objection to Washington as a summit venue and moved on to practical
matters. The two sides tried to formulate a common basis for evaluat-
ing their capacities in intermediate- and short-range weapons; they
also edged towards agreement on procedures of verification. As Gor-
bachëv pointed out, this still left the big question of strategic nuclear
weaponry and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty unresolved. He accused
Washington of intransigence and called on the Americans to stick
to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty for another ten years; he offered to
negotiate about exactly what kinds of device were to be permissible for