290 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
deployment in outer space. As a token of good intent, he said he
would consider suspending work on the Krasnoyarsk radar station;
but he rejected Kampelman’s argument in Geneva in favour of keeping
separate the talks on strategic weapons and those on the Strategic
Defense Initiative.^27
Gorbachëv and Shultz concurred that they had the basis at least for
a treaty on intermediate-range nuclear missiles, and the Soviet side
called for Gorbachëv’s trip to receive the highest status in Washington.
After the autumn of political trouble in Moscow, Gorbachëv sought to
boost his image through the medium of international acclaim. His
aides asked for him to receive an invitation to address a joint session of
the American Congress. This was an accolade too many for an Ameri-
can conservative administration.^28 The working parties had yet to
resolve several problems that stood in the way of the treaty, and Reagan
trod carefully in his preparations for the talks. People around Gor-
bachëv were equally cautious. On the flight to America, one of his team
quipped: ‘If any general discovers who’s on this aircraft, he’ll brandish a
rocket and that’ll be the end of perestroika.’^29 The joke referred to what
the Soviet high command might get up to. Everyone laughed while
hoping against hope that Gorbachëv would keep command of the situ-
ation. To put it mildly, a lot was at stake on both sides of the Atlantic
and Gorbachëv and Reagan were wise to approach the summit with
prudence.
The summit started on 8 December 1987 before everything was
settled. The Soviet delegation arrived in Washington refusing to hand
over a technical photo of their SS-20 missile. The draft treaty required
the destruction of all such missiles. Soviet negotiators explained that
SS-20s were assembled inside a kind of canister that made them
impossible to photograph. Powell was minded to overlook the diffi-
culty; but others on the American side wanted to hang tough, and
Shultz agreed with them. Soviet negotiators learned that if they wanted
a treaty, they would have to give way.^30
This they duly did, and the way was clear for a signing ceremony
in the White House. It was an occasion of importance. The super-
powers were not just limiting but rather eliminating a whole category
of nuclear weaponry from their forces. Reagan and Gorbachëv ap -
pended their signatures in the East Room of the White House – only
the process of ratification lay ahead. Next day, on 9 December, Reagan
went into talks with Gorbachëv accompanied by Shultz and Carlucci.
He confirmed acceptance of the objective of halving the number of