292 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
delegations in Geneva could speed up their work, he said, it might
prove feasible to get a draft treaty ready for signature at the next
summit in Moscow.^35
As Shultz headed off for a meeting of NATO foreign ministers
in Brussels, he cautioned against undue optimism: ‘It is too soon to
tell whether this prefigures a profound change in the nature of the
Soviet Union and how it deals with the world.’^36 Yet there had been
unquestionable progress at the summit, and Shultz took pride in it. A
unanimous decision emerged from the meeting to urge the American
Senate to ratify the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty without
delay.^37 He told the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee that Reagan’s
toughness had proved that America would never give way in matters
of vital interest. He expected no difficulty for the White House with
the NATO allies.^38 He wrote to Senate Democrat leader Robert Byrd
promising to provide senators with confidential information to assure
them that the administration was keeping nothing back. He was will-
ing to release the entire record of the American–Soviet negotiations.^39
When Senators Byrd and Nunn wrote back in a friendly spirit, Shultz
promised that the administration would stick to its publicly announced
understanding of the clauses. There would be no sudden deviation
that might cause unease in the Senate.^40
Shultz worked for that further agreement on strategic weapons
before Reagan left office.^41 There was agreement about holding the
next summit in Moscow in summer. On 9 February 1988 the Ameri-
can National Security Planning Group met to map out strategy. The
President gave his word: ‘I will not rush to an agreement for agree-
ment’s sake.’^42 Powell predicted difficulties.^43 When even Shultz
expressed unease, Reagan exclaimed:
From my past experiences as a labor negotiator, maybe we need to
do this; we need to go for the gold. You need to put down what the
ideal agreement would be. After you’ve done that, you can decide
among yourselves what our bottom lines should be – what we can
and what [we] can’t give up beyond; also where there’s no bar-
gaining – those items on which we can’t bargain.^44He encouraged his officials to play a harder game for victory. Defense
Secretary Carlucci tried to douse the enthusiasm. He reported that he
and William Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs, heard at
the Congress about a growing worry that the President might rush
into a treaty.^45 Chief of Staff Baker said that the administration had to