GRINDING OUT THE TREATY 293stay united.^46 Shultz stressed that ‘the Soviets also want to ratify these
treaties’; he asked for approval from everyone around the table. Powell
said he could count on this.^47
Gorbachëv was eager to keep up the momentum, as he explained
to the Politburo on 25 February:
Yes, we’ve obtained military-strategic parity with the United
States. Nobody considered how much this cost us. But we really
should count it up. It’s now clear that without a significant
reduction in military expenditure we can’t resolve the problems
of perestroika. Parity is parity, and we must preserve it. But it’s
also necessary to disarm. And now such an opportunity exists.^48He called for a proper scientific analysis of the Strategic Defense
Initiative: was it ‘a bluff or a reality’? Only when this question was
authoritatively answered would it be possible to establish ‘the sole cor-
rect policy’. He added that it was essential to create a peace that
was genuinely dependable: ‘The people remember the year 1941!’^49
But the American Senate stalled about ratifying the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Former Secretary of State Kissinger
scowled about it even though he saw no alternative to signing it.^50 Not
all conservatives were as accommodating. Dan Quale, a young Senator
on the Armed Forces Committee, denounced the terms as damaging
to the national interest.^51 Trouble also came from Senator Jesse Helms,
the veteran Republican known for his hostility to conciliatory moves
toward the USSR. When Shultz appeared at the Senate Foreign Re -
lations Committee, Helms accused the administration of ‘confusion,
misstatements and . . . even mispresentation’ in its public presentation
of the treaty. Shultz had heard enough. He asked Helms directly
whether he was accusing him of deliberately distorting the facts.
Although Helms backed down, Shultz’s anger was not yet spent: ‘I
don’t know what I’m doing here.’ This comment induced Helms to jab
back: ‘You’ll have to decide why you’re here.’ Senior Senators from the
Democratic Party intervened to help Shultz out. The Democrats were
not entirely helpful since they wanted to deny the President any right
to reinterpret the treaty after ratification; but they certainly endorsed
the need for ratification.^52
US Senators Nunn, Cohen, Levin and Warner met Gorbachëv in
Moscow in March with a view towards facilitating the process. When
Gorbachëv talked airily about creating a European ‘corridor’ free from
nuclear and chemical weapons, Nunn explained that the Americans