GRINDING OUT THE TREATY 295tion of not having received a copy of the text. The presidential
speechwriters, he thought, had overlooked the sensitivities of the
diplomatic moment.^58 Shultz had no option but to sit back and let
Gorbachëv’s rage blow itself out before impressing on him that Reagan
really had benevolent intentions. He also pointed to the vote in the
House of Representatives, by a majority of 393 to 7, in favour of the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The atmosphere steadily
cleared.^59 Shultz reported to Reagan: ‘Today Gorbachëv was peppy,
reflective and humorous by turns.’^60 But he wished to focus attention
on the requirements for the forthcoming summit. Another Springfield
speech would hinder this. Having spelled out his concern, Shultz
recalled that when he first became Secretary of State, Reagan had
given him a glass tablet inscribed with the quotation: ‘There is no limit
to what you can do or how far you can go as long as you don’t care
who gets the credit.’^61
Unfortunately the American Senate had yet to complete its delib-
erations. At talks in Geneva on 10 May, Shultz told Shevardnadze of
his annoyance about the delay. Shevardnadze replied: ‘For us this has
been unexpected to the highest degree.’ The news that the Chinese
were selling ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia was also agitating him.
Shultz and Shevardnadze agreed to consult about the problem.^62
On 23 May Reagan told the National Security Planning Commit-
tee: ‘I want to leave as a legacy as complete and coherent an arms
reduction position as I can.’^63 Shultz admitted: ‘The only thing we can
do right now is listen and keep our options open and look for the right
opening.’^64 He swore to be firm about the Strategic Defense Initiative
and to stipulate the need to dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar station in
return for America. He argued that America’s interest continued to lie
with adhering to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.^65 Defense Secretary
Carlucci was in no doubt: ‘I’m here to tell you, George, that if you
come out of the review with the K-radar not down, and you don’t
declare a material breach, you’ll never see a [strategic nuclear weapons
reduction] treaty!’ National Security Adviser Powell warned about the
criticism that Senator Helms would level against any display of soft-
ness towards the USSR. Rowny, as the President’s Special Adviser on
Arms Control, recommended telling Gorbachëv that America’s posi-
tion on Krasnoyarsk was closed to negotiation. Shultz replied: ‘How
can you claim a material breach and still retain the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty? And by the way, when we call material breach for that,
they’ll call a tit-for-tat at Fylingdales.’ Carlucci nagged away until