296 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
Shultz proved willing to say that all ‘agreed that there would be no
START treaty until the K-radar is down’.^66
Neither the American nor the Soviet leaders expected to take
definitive decisions on strategic nuclear weapons at the Moscow
summit. As the Big Five set about drafting advice for Gorbachëv, they
offered few guidelines beyond advising him to keep account of the
political pressure that the American political right was exerting upon
Reagan.^67 This vagueness lent Gorbachëv some latitude for personal
initiative. He intended to accord the kind of freedom that he himself
had received in Washington. Reagan would deliver a speech on live,
uncensored TV to Moscow State University students. Gorbachëv also
had the idea for the two of them to take a public stroll on Red Square.
He trusted ordinary Russians to behave with suitable dignity.^68 The
Americans could invite whomever they liked to their embassy gather-
ings: Gorbachëv wanted to demonstrate that things had really changed
fundamentally in the USSR. Moscow was clean but dowdy, and Gor-
bachëv gave orders to brighten the appearance of the buildings. The
police cleared the prostitutes from the tourist hotels in the central
zone. The authorities were determined that the President’s party of 800
officials and the press corps of 3,300 should gain no glimpse of Soviet
lives lived outside the law.^69
At last on 27 May the Senate voted its approval of the treaty by 93
votes to 5. The USSR Supreme Soviet ratified it by unanimous accla-
mation. This confirmed the rationale for the summit and the President
and First Lady flew immediately to Moscow, arriving in Air Force One
at Vnukovo airport on 29 May.
Shevardnadze welcomed Shultz on the same evening. When Shultz
expressed regret about the failure to produce a draft on strategic
weapons, Shevardnadze replied that at least they had laid the founda-
tions. He added that the General Staff shared this attitude – and
Akhromeev backed him up. Work would begin immediately.^70 Nobody
expected it to reach completion before the year was out – and by then
Reagan would be reaching the end of his presidential term. Moving
on to other matters, Shevardnadze mentioned what he called abuses of
power in America. He said he had heard that there were 11,000 polit-
ical prisoners. But as he acknowledged, he had no list of names and
could not cite a source for his allegation.^71 He was more confident
when talking about Afghanistan. He bemoaned Pakistan’s infringe-
ment of the Geneva Accords; he commented that Gorbachëv saw the
Afghan question as ‘the touchstone’ of the superpowers’ capacity to