GRINDING OUT THE TREATY 297settle regional conflicts. Moscow’s compliance with the Accords would
depend on Islamabad’s behaviour.^72 Shultz declined to react to this
implicit threat and simply repeated his demand for the dismantling
of the Krasnoyarsk early-warning station. Shevardnadze had given a
private commitment to this outcome, but Shultz asked for action.
There was a sticky moment before Shevardnadze deftly passed the
topic over to Akhromeev for elaboration.^73
In the working group on regional conflicts, there was an exchange
of information about southern Africa – and Adamishin stressed that
there could be no peace in the region until apartheid was ended.^74
Soviet officials stressed that foreign forces should nevertheless pull out
of Angola; and they included the Cubans in this.^75 As regards Kampu-
chea, both sides opposed a return to power by Pol Pot’s genocidal
administration. The Americans pointed out that a complete withdrawal
of Vietnamese forces alone would satisfy China.^76 The Americans were
‘still looking for the beef ’.^77 In truth, many conflicts were beyond direct
control of either superpower. On North Korea, nobody had any idea
about how to induce Kim Il-sung to lessen the tension. There was even
more gloom about events in the Middle East.^78 The Americans took
exception to the continued military supplies to Nicaragua.^79 Soviet offi-
cials countered that Pakistan was systematically violating the Geneva
Accords by shipping arms over the Afghan border. The Americans
gave them short shrift. If the USSR had agreed to cease supplying
Afghanistan’s communist government, they might have listened more
sympathetically.^80 They added that the mujahidin were fighting with
arms they captured from the Afghan communists that Moscow per-
sisted in delivering. America’s preferred solution was for the USSR to
cease transferring weaponry to their Afghan clients.^81
Disagreements took place without polemics. One of the smoothest
encounters was between Defence Minister Yazov and Defense Secre-
tary Carlucci. According to Carlucci, the Warsaw Pact’s forces had a
structural bias towards invading Western Europe. Yazov replied that
Soviet military doctrine was preponderantly defensive; he cited official
statements to this effect and asked why American leaders did not
believe in them. Akhromeev unfurled a map showing all the American
military bases around the USSR’s borders. If America felt threatened,
so too did the USSR. Carlucci asked Yazov to appreciate the logistical
needs of an ‘island nation’ like America. Yazov forbore to ask what
Canadians and Mexicans might think about this geographical concep-
tion. Carlucci’s main point was that American forces were designed to