304 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
officials.^15 Thatcher took no notice. The worry for her remained that
the Soviet leadership might be fooling everyone. In the American
spectrum of analysis, she was nearer to Weinberger than to Shultz. She
was jealous of her reputation as the Iron Lady.
If Soviet leaders were going to soften her metal, they had to light a
furnace in Moscow. Gorbachëv appreciated Thatcher’s communion
with Reagan. The convention for America and Britain was that if one
of them had contact with Gorbachëv, a report would be made to the
other.^16 Gorbachëv wished to use Thatcher as a way of exerting influ-
ence on the White House. By late 1986 he had abandoned any illusion
about playing the West Europeans against the Americans. He no
longer imagined that he could persuade France to act separately from
NATO. In May 1987 he advised the Politburo that the French Prime
Minister Jacques Chirac felt a political need to appear tough-minded
in any negotiations with the Kremlin. Chirac was at one with Thatcher
on questions of military security.^17 Gorbachëv had no greater con-
fidence about Chancellor Kohl, who in October 1986 had compared
him to Joseph Goebbels in public relations technique.^18 Kohl had
half-apologized for the gaffe but Soviet resentment still simmered
even though Gorbachëv recognized the need for better ties with West
Germany.^19 Gorbachëv’s planning stayed focused on Thatcher, and
an invitation went out to her to visit Moscow – which, to the delight
of her advisers, she immediately accepted. There was excitement in
British political circles about the projected trip.^20
The Politburo had little presentiment about her likely impact in
Moscow. Mannered in diction and laboured in rhetoric, she had always
been at her best in front of people who were already on her side. Her
ability to win over the unconverted was open to doubt. The Soviet
authorities assumed that it was they who possessed the more commu-
nicative leader. Only Reagan matched Gorbachëv’s stellar appeal. Surely
the General Secretary would be more than a match for the Iron Lady!
They overlooked her combative side. Gorbachëv had experienced it at
Chequers in December 1984. He was about to discover that she could
deploy it just as readily on Soviet soil. As was her wont, she prepared
intensively. She took advice from the KGB defector Oleg Gordievski
about how to behave and what to say.^21 Gordievski knew better than
anyone about the vulnerable points for a Westerner to probe. In the
Prime Minister, he found a listener and learner.
On 29 March 1987 Prime Minister Ryzhkov welcomed her at
Vnukovo airport. Ahead lay five days of meetings and appearances.