CALLS TO WESTERN EUROPE 307enment from Howe, who confined himself to expressing doubt that
the dogmas of communist policy had disappeared even under
Gorbachëv.^29
Thatcher was displeased when she heard that Gorbachëv was
going to America in December 1987 to sign the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces Treaty. Nobody had consulted her for the duration of
the negotiations between America and the USSR. Having recently
dropped her frostiness towards Gorbachëv, she wanted to become
involved. Summoning Ambassador Zamyatin, she exclaimed: ‘Please,
tell Gorbachëv that I am prepared to receive him on his way to
Washington for two to three hours at our Brize Norton base where
no Russian aircraft has ever been.’^30 Chernyaev counselled that it was
in the Soviet interest to make her ‘the big present’ of enhancing
her global prominence by granting the request. This was something
she was eager for. In return the USSR would obtain her support for
perestroika.^31 Gorbachëv agreed. Thatcher boasted to the press of their
spirited exchanges:
The atmosphere today has been very, very good indeed. It usually
is when Mr Gorbachev and I get talking, because we talk certainly
in quite animated debate as always. He is a powerful personality
and I do not think I am anything other than that too! So, it is quite
animated, but that way you get to grips with the issues very quickly.
The atmosphere was good. Of course, I am not a go-between. I am
quite an important part of the NATO alliance, and I am a very
reliable ally, and no one has any doubt where I stand.^32She omitted to mention that she was no longer trying to impede the
conciliation between Gorbachëv and Reagan. Gorbachëv conceded
nothing to her at Brize Norton and flew on to America having
achieved her promise of support.^33 The reasons for her cooperativeness
can only be guessed at. Perhaps Chernyaev, her secret admirer, was
right about her need for the oxygen of prestige. Or possibly she at last
decided that if she could not beat them, she was going to join them.
Was there also a personal factor? Her warmth towards Gorbachëv had
been quietly evident to her advisers since the visit to Moscow. They
began to find it hard to ‘talk objectively’ with her about him.^34 There
was abundant evidence that the USSR had a huge stock of chemical
weapons. Thatcher deplored this to Ryzhkov. When Gorbachëv gave
his word that no such stocks existed, Thatcher refused to believe that
he was lying. She believed that ‘the facts had been kept from him’.^35