CALLS TO WESTERN EUROPE 311for scientific and technical cooperation between Paris and Moscow;
and Gorbachëv reported to the Politburo that Mitterrand promised to
campaign to lift the CoCom restrictions on sales of advanced tech-
nology.^52 Gorbachëv’s was an over-optimistic report. Really he had
only persuaded Mitterrand to ask his ministers to supply him with
their lists of banned goods. This was a long way short of a commit-
ment to changing policy.
Mitterrand anyway had a habit of saying one thing and doing
another, and Gorbachëv was aware of this. When talking to the Polit-
buro, the General Secretary was giving things a spin that suited his
current political designs. He had an interest in conserving the consen-
sus among Soviet leaders on foreign policy. A bit of exaggeration was
an instrument in his toolbox.
Western Europe presented problems. While Mitterrand was un -
reliable and Kohl stand-offish, it was prudent to stay on good terms
with Thatcher. Having accepted her invitation to visit London in April
1989, he found her on combative form. She flailed at the British estab-
lishment. She attacked the other Western leaders, including President
Bush. She tore into the USSR and predicted doom for the Soviet revo-
lutionary syndrome. In her opinion, Gorbachëv had no choice but to
take the same road as the rest of the world. She said that when this
happened, the whole world would become a different place.^53 This
reasserted her belief in mutually assured destruction: ‘Both our coun-
tries [USSR and UK] know from bitter experience that conventional
weapons do not deter war in Europe, whereas nuclear weapons have
done so for over forty years. As a deterrent, there is no substitute for
them.’^54 Her ease with him was remarkable as they tumbled about in
dispute. She even disclosed that she expected to step down at the next
general election. She saw similarities between his reforms and hers,
saying that the British ‘perestroika’ had already lasted nearly seven
years. She chuckled: ‘Look, we have Thatcherism and you have Gor-
bachëvism.’ She said he should have prioritized measures to raise the
Soviet standard of living. For once, she sensed that she sounded too
brusque. Confiding that the situation in Northern Ireland gave her a
headache, she admitted: ‘I know that you too have a headache about
the future USSR.’^55
Whenever they appeared together in public, by then, Thatcher no
longer voiced reservations about his policies. She appeared Gor-
bachëv’s amicable follower more than his rival and critic. Interpreter
Igor Korchilov recalled: