312 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
I had noticed, like probably everyone else in the room, that when
Gorbachev was giving a speech, she’d looked at him with such
intense adoration in her eyes that this could only be interpreted as
a manifestation of that ‘special personal chemistry’ that was said
to exist between these two extraordinary leaders. Later, when we
returned to the Embassy after dinner, Yakovlev would attempt to
tease Gorbachev about this, but Raisa Maximovna discouraged
the insinuation by gripping him firmly by the arm and leading
him away upstairs, saying, ‘Good night, everybody.’^56Yakovlev was not the only one to notice Mrs Thatcher’s strange com-
portment. Perhaps she had picked up an idea or two from Nancy
Reagan’s way of supporting her husband. She had decided to identify
herself with the Soviet leader and his bid to transform the Soviet
Union. Her tendency was always to follow a line unflinchingly once
she had made up her mind. She was determined to demonstrate the
bond that she felt with Gorbachëv.
Gorbachëv sat down with Raisa, Yakovlev, Shevardnadze and
Chernyaev to mull over his London experience. The Prime Minister
had her ideas, he concluded, and ‘we’ had ours.^57 He told the Politburo:
‘I like Thatcher’s independence. One can talk to her about anything
one likes. And she understands everything. She’s a dependable person.
Every time we argue very sharply about nuclear arms. She has the
need to fight her corner. She senses the flaws in her position.’^58
This was a long way short of adulation. Indeed, Gorbachëv said
she had conceived a foolish ambition to become ‘the leader of the
West’ after Reagan’s departure from the White House. He claimed to
notice that Bush and Kohl regarded her ‘rather ironically’. But Gor-
bachëv urged that it remained useful to keep talking to her: ‘Contact
with her is important.’^59 She warmly reciprocated despite authorizing
the expulsion of eight Soviet officials and three journalists from the
United Kingdom a month later. She sent a confidential letter explain-
ing to Gorbachëv that this would not change her friendly attitude to
him and perestroika. She was also going to minimize publicity for what
she was doing.^60
Thatcher, Kohl and Mitterrand had steadily grown less worried
about him as he showed a readiness to appreciate the reasons why they
continued to worry about the Soviet military threat. The Americans
had become used to warnings from their NATO allies about the need
to avoid undue concessions to Moscow. The Kremlin’s eagerness to