28. EASTERN EUROPE: PERPLEXITY AND PROTEST
Gorbachëv could not afford to court Western European governments
at the expense of Soviet interests in Eastern Europe. Events in the
region had always impinged on Moscow politics. The USSR was
the dominant regional power. The Politburo had sent in its tanks and
fighter aircraft when the communist order appeared under threat in
Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. But increasingly the
Politburo consulted with the East European rulers about both eco-
nomic relations and military preparations. There was constant
discussion of budgetary dilemmas. Usually it was East Europeans who
pushed for reforms. Under Gorbachëv it was the Soviet leadership
which campaigned for radical change.
The Party General Secretaries of the Warsaw Pact countries met
four times in 1985, first in Moscow and then in Warsaw, Sofia and
Bucharest, to discuss a common strategy. As the gnarled veterans
gained acquaintance with the USSR’s new ruler, he changed little in his
thinking about Eastern Europe in his early years of power. He hoped
that the region’s rulers would take the Soviet path to reform. He
wanted them to act of their own volition, but did not expect this to
happen very quickly since he knew that all of them were conservative
in their communism. He calculated that he had no choice but to work
with them. He needed time and calm to conduct perestroika in the
USSR and feared that any outbreak of political instability in the region
could have the consequence of blowing him off course. At the same
time he issued a warning to the East European rulers that they could
no longer count on Soviet forces to rescue them from internal political
trouble. They had to cope on their own in ruling their countries. Gor-
bachëv saw this as a useful incentive for them to phase out their
traditional policies. The USSR, he maintained, had to establish a fresh