EASTERN EUROPE: PERPLEXITY AND PROTEST 315relationship with the region. He hoped to drain the waters of national
resentment by forswearing the Muscovite imperiousness of his pre-
decessors, and he committed himself to engaging in more frequent
consultation.
Deals were signed inside Comecon to enhance economic cooper-
ation across the region. The Soviet leaders were proud of an agreement
to form an ‘Interrobot’ company.^1 Their naivety shone out of their
declarations. They underestimated the seismic effects of informational
technology in the West. They really had no strategy for Eastern
Europe, only a hope that its rulers would somehow find a way to in te-
grate their industrial and technological efforts.
The Politburo – not Gorbachëv alone – hardly bothered itself with
the East Europeans except when they were causing trouble. Of course,
the Warsaw Pact allies had to be kept informed about plans for talks
with the Americans. Fellow communist rulers were suspicious of Gor-
bachëv’s reforms in the USSR. Moscow’s foreign policy was a different
matter. All of them sought a relaxation of tension in Europe, and Gor-
bachëv provided the hope of an end to military confrontation; and if
he proved successful, Eastern Europe would be able to divert expendi-
ture to the needs of consumers. When Shevardnadze went to the
gathering of foreign ministers in Poland in mid-March 1986, he heard
little but praise for Gorbachëv. Ilie Văduva, the Romanian Foreign
Affairs Minister, was unusual in striking a sour note – Văduva called
for the disbandment of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and for the
removal of foreign garrisons. The Romanians had always wanted to get
the Soviet armed forces out of the region, and Gorbachëv’s promises
about national sovereignty provided a chance to raise the matter. They
knew that the others would frown on Văduva’s contribution. The East
Germans predictably rallied to the Soviet side and thanked Shevard-
nadze for sharing his news about how things were going with the
Americans.^2 Shevardnadze felt pleased. At least about the USSR’s global
strategy, nearly the entire alliance had offered warm support.
Gorbachëv thought Reagan might make a fuss about Eastern
Europe at their talks, and went over policy towards the two Germanies
in preparation.^3 He visited Warsaw to see things for himself in late
June 1986. Communist leaders received him with applause and swore
abiding friendship with the USSR. Gorbachëv acknowledged the
damage done to Poland by the Chernobyl nuclear explosion – this
earned him an ovation. He felt that he had learned about how divided
Poles were about their government.^4 If anything, he still failed to