324 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
Husák confined himself to ‘cloudy’ generalities, prompting one of his
listeners to whisper to his neighbour that the Czechoslovak leader was
applying for his retirement pension. Only Zhivkov spoke grudgingly.
He asked for greater attention to be paid to Eastern Europe and
denounced Soviet commentators who were writing about ‘socialism’
remaining at a ‘feudal stage of its development’.^46
On 11 January 1988 Gorbachëv told the new First Secretary of the
Czechoslovak Communist Party Miklos Jakes that the Italian com-
rades had urged him to ask for a re-evaluation of Alexander Dubček.
They denied the idea that he was an enemy of the people. Jakes replied
that rehabilitations had already taken place, but the case of Dubček
was a step too far for him. Gorbachëv lamely agreed; he declined to
propose the Prague Spring leaders as his own predecessors as re-
formers.^47 On 18 April 1989 he underlined this attitude when telling
Jakes that the Czechoslovak situation had moved towards counter-
revolution by summer 1968.^48 This was not the way he spoke to
friends, and it was a sign of his willingness to forswear his opinions in
pursuit of geopolitical objectives.
Gorbachëv’s focus in Eastern Europe remained on preserving ‘the
political stability of the socialist countries’.^49 Soviet economic interests
were another priority. He explained his dilemma to the Politburo in
March 1988: ‘We’ve got to think out the integration process in Com-
econ. This is politics on the biggest scale, not to mention economics;
80 billion rubles in commodity exchange. It’s not just that they can’t
manage without us: we can’t manage without them.’^50 Whereas the
USSR could produce special ball-bearings for 60 rubles and sell them
for 400 rubles on the world market, its ‘friends’ were too poor to pay
such a price. Poland and Hungary depended on Western financial
credits and cheap raw materials from the USSR. So what should be the
Politburo’s strategy? The snag was that the current economic situation
in Eastern Europe could not last indefinitely: ‘It needs to be said
directly in Comecon: are we going to integrate or not? And they have
to decide, because we can’t endlessly be a fount of cheap resources for
them. If they say no, our hands will be freed. We need to say: you’ve
got a straight choice. And let’s quit putting out triumphal information
about mutual relations in Comecon. Everyone knows what the real
situation is.’^51
Gorbachëv visited Yugoslavia soon afterwards and experienced
the enthusiasm of crowds in Belgrade. Whereas Stalin had tried
to bully Tito into subjection, Gorbachëv pledged his commitment to