326 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
Events in Poland had a momentum of their own. Jaruzelski’s sup-
pression of Solidarity failed to prevent a series of strikes and political
protests in March 1988. The authorities carried out further arrests but
by April there was paralysis in factories, mines and shipyards. Calm
returned after yet another round of police activity. When Gorbachëv
visited Warsaw in mid-July, he coaxed the Polish communist leader-
ship to undertake political and economic reforms – he felt he could no
longer sit quietly on the sidelines.^58 He enjoyed the reception he had
from ordinary Poles; and he convinced himself that they favoured
deepened collaboration with the USSR.^59 He mistook friendliness
towards himself for acquiescence in Poland’s communist administra-
tion. Bigger strikes broke out practically everywhere in August. As the
economy juddered to a halt, opinion was divided in the Polish Party
Politburo. Some members called for a redoubling of military repression
until Internal Affairs Minister Mieczysław Rakowski pointed to the
damaging consequences.^60 Jaruzelski decided to form a new cabinet
that would include ministers who had no association with commu-
nism. His guideline was be ‘compromise, yes, capitulation, no’.^61 He
applauded the policies of Gorbachëv in the USSR and expressed appre-
ciation of the Soviet ‘hands-off ’ approach to the Polish crisis.^62
Moscow continued to push the Polish communist leadership
towards internal reform. In September 1988 Nikolai Shishlin of the
Party International Department gave an interview to Le Monde
expressing a lack of fear about the open re-establishment of Solidarity.
Negotiations ensued in Moscow with Poland’s sluggish authorities.^63
Georgi Shakhnazarov was impatient with how things were being
handled. He had worked for years in the Party International Depart-
ment before becoming one of Gorbachëv’s personal assistants. In his
view, the Politburo had been muddling its way without a distinct
policy on Eastern Europe. He could see at close quarters that Gor-
bachëv, laden with so many other items on his agenda, was failing to
appreciate the dangers of the situation. On 6 October he sent him a
stiff memo laying out his concerns. Shakhnazarov lamented the refusal
of Honecker and Ceauşescu to take the path of reform; he wrote that
their conservatism could only deepen the crisis within socialism
around the world. Soviet leaders had to face up to the likelihood that
Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic and
even Czechoslovakia were about to go bankrupt. Popular discontent
was easy to predict. Shakhnazarov called for the Politburo to decide on
a policy for the probable contingencies. What would Moscow do if