The End of the Cold War. 1985-1991

(Sean Pound) #1
29. THE LEAVING OF AFGHANISTAN

Strange as it may seem, questions about East Germany, Hungary and
even Poland cropped up little in the talks between America and the
Soviet Union. Afghanistan by contrast attracted ceaseless attention.
The Americans since 1984 had included ‘regional conflicts’ on their
agenda for talks with the USSR. For them, the Afghan question was a
litmus test of Gorbachëv’s sincerity in changing his entire foreign
policy. Reagan and Shultz made a constant demand for the pull-out
of Soviet forces. Gorbachëv had indicated at the Geneva summit of
November 1985, albeit in general terms, that he already had this in
mind. His commitment increased in the years that followed, and he
regularly read out searing letters to the Politburo from mothers who
wished to know what was happening to their boys.
Most governments were pleased with the signs of incipient change
in Moscow’s policy, but this was not true of all of them. Rajiv Gandhi
and other Indians counselled Gorbachëv and Shevardnadze to tread
with caution about how they left Afghanistan. They themselves sought
to make trouble for the Pakistanis. They warned Kremlin leaders that
Pakistan, an American ally, had the potential to move into any power
vacuum in Kabul – a source of worry for both New Delhi and
Moscow.^1 Some African politicians visiting Moscow showed a similar
caution about the projected military withdrawal of the Soviet Army;
they warned that the USSR’s influence around the world would fade as
‘imperialism’ took its opportunity to go on the offensive.^2 These were
not the usual reactions to Gorbachëv’s initiative. Although Fidel
Castro was no admirer of the Soviet perestroika, he gave warm
approval to the retreat from Afghanistan. His grouse to Shevardnadze
was that the invasion had always been a terrible mistake and had put
the Cubans into ‘a completely impossible situation’.^3 Gorbachëv had
grounds for thinking that Castro was more in line with world opinion
than Gandhi. He anyway saw no point in prolonging the army’s
travails on Afghan soil.

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