332 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
The Politburo listened to what Shevardnadze had to say on 21 Jan-
uary. He spoke of the ‘good impression’ that Najibullah had made on
him despite how badly he had let down the peasantry. The annual cost
of the war to the USSR was at least a billion rubles – the Americans
thought it could be double that total while the Japanese put it at triple:
‘We must do everything we can to get out.’ No amount of assistance
from Moscow would improve things in Kabul. The Soviet Union had
an interest in starting up confidential talks with the Americans and
dissuading them from meddling.^15 Shevardnadze questioned whether
Soviet leaders had known what they were doing when ordering the
invasion. This was an affront to Gromyko. Gorbachëv intervened to
prevent a dispute because he needed consensus in the Politburo on the
current agenda. Ryzhkov praised Shevardnadze for his ‘realistic
picture’; he called for the Soviet Army to leave a ‘neutral, friendly
government’ behind in Afghanistan. Ligachëv spoke in support.
The Politburo hoped to withdraw its army without detriment to the
interests of the Afghan ‘progressive forces’. Sokolov warned that this
was unachievable by military means. Political action was required in
Afghanistan and abroad.^16
According to Gorbachëv, the Soviet leadership had been under
the spell of ideology when invading Afghanistan. Reality proved the
impossibility of moving from feudalism to socialism in one big leap.
The military intervention had to be brought to a close. Approaches
should be made to the United Nations, Pakistan and America. (He had
no confidence that he could persuade Iran to help.) He wanted to
bring the process to completion inside two years.^17
Shevardnadze presented his proposals to the Politburo in Febru-
ary. He said it was crucial to equip the Najibullah administration with
the capacity to survive. If the withdrawal happened in too hurried a
fashion, the Kabul government would fall apart. Najibullah’s people
were already panicking.^18 Gorbachëv liked what he heard and pro-
fessed a willingness to come to terms with Pakistan’s Zia-ul-Haq: in
return for his cooperation he would override Najibullah’s objections.^19
Even Gromyko came round to supporting the pull-out. He recalled
that the Afghan communists had appealed eleven times to Moscow for
military intervention before the Politburo gave its consent; but he
admitted that the leadership had entertained a simplistic idea about
the likely consequences. With hindsight, he doubted that any amount
of Soviet assistance could have established an effective Afghan army.
The old man’s semi-apology exasperated Gorbachëv, who offered the