334 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
Shultz thought this unrealistic after all that had happened in the coun-
try.^26 But he and the rest of the American administration were pleased
about the way that things were going. Afghanistan, since the Soviet
invasion, had become one of the testing grounds of Soviet intentions in
external policy. The Americans sometimes talked about how they
would like to help the process of withdrawal. In reality they continued
to aggravate problems by aiding the mujahidin. The USSR, as they saw
it, needed to accept the consequences of its military failure. There was
going to be no direct alleviation of the pain of withdrawal.
The Afghan communist leadership had removed Karmal from
power in November 1986 and sent him into retirement in Moscow.
But Najibullah, who made himself President in September 1987,
proved to be no better at the task of national reconciliation than
Karmal had been. It fell to Shevardnadze in January 1988 to fly to
Afghanistan and press the case.^27 He explained to Soviet officials in
Kabul that the Politburo wished to push for agreement on a coalition
government. When Najibullah objected, it was their job to strip him of
his illusions.^28 Varennikov reported that conditions varied from city to
city – he thought they were best in the east of the country. Shevard-
nadze and his team knew that Najibullah’s people had no plan for what
to do after the Soviet pull-out. Najibullah, according to Varennikov,
believed that he would not long survive and nobody in Kabul contra-
dicted this prognosis. Shevardnadze had no solution for the Afghan
comrades. The point for him was that the Soviet leadership had con-
trived a dreadful situation and had to withdraw from the country and
its war.^29
The Americans prolonged their pressure in the Geneva talks and
demanded the departure of forces before Reagan arrived in Moscow
for his summer summit with Gorbachëv. The Politburo’s Afghan Com-
mission was always unlikely to approve of such acceleration, and at its
meeting on 11 March Kornienko and Akhromeev were furious about
the idea.^30 Days later, on 23 March, Shultz and Shevardnadze clashed.
Shultz called for ‘symmetry’ in policy on American and Soviet arms
shipments: he offered to recommend an end to US military supplies to
Afghanistan in return for the USSR ceasing to arm its Afghan commu-
nist clients. Shevardnadze exclaimed: ‘In no circumstances whatever!
That idea won’t pass!’ Shultz and Shevardnadze also failed to agree on
which kind of fighters should be allowed to receive assistance. The
Americans wanted to ban allocations to ‘hired’ men while exempting
the mujahidin on the grounds that they were volunteers. Shevard-