THE LEAVING OF AFGHANISTAN 335nadze rejected this suggestion but failed to provide an alternative that
Shultz would accept.^31 There was no way through the impasse. Soviet
leaders had to accept this reality or forfeit the chance to sign the rest
of the agreement.
On 2 April the Politburo considered the draft accords to be signed
by the governments of Afghanistan, Pakistan, America and the USSR.
Shevardnadze had tried yet again to get the Americans to cut off sup-
plies to the mujahidin. Shultz replied by letter that if Soviet leaders
really wanted a deal, they had to drop any such stipulation.^32 They saw
that Reagan was not going to yield on the matter; they anyway reck-
oned that even if he signed his assent, it would not be worth the paper
it was written on. Gorbachëv decided to get the Politburo to approve
the deal as it stood. He was keen to have matters resolved before the
Moscow summit so as to avoid giving the impression of acting under
American duress. He wanted the entire Politburo to take responsibility
for the decision and asked for the vote of each of its members to be
recorded.^33 His proposal received unanimous approval. The General
Staff had prepared an operational plan for withdrawal, and Akhro-
meev had been invited to the meeting to explain it. Akhromeev was
just as keen as Gorbachëv to bring the Soviet Army home. Unrolling a
map of Afghanistan, he indicated how he intended to do this. The
Politburo agreed to implement his plan from 15 May regardless of
what happened in the Geneva talks.^34
Gorbachëv and Shevardnadze shared the political load. Shevard-
nadze flew to Kabul to confer with Soviet military and civilian
personnel about how to accomplish the final retreat. He informed
Najibullah about the Politburo’s intentions. It was a depressing experi-
ence for Shevardnadze, who lamented that the presence of Soviet
troops had served to unify the Afghan resistance.^35 Najibullah was
naturally displeased, and Gorbachëv invited him to a meeting on
Soviet soil – in Tashkent – on 7 April. Gorbachëv took Kryuchkov
with him so as to have someone who had personal experience of
Afghan conditions. He explained the change in Moscow’s policy and
urged the desirability of concessions to political pluralism, peasant
demands and Islam.^36 When reporting later to the Politburo, Gor-
bachëv admitted that he could not be sure that Najibullah had the
capacity or desire to follow the advice.^37
But the way was clear for treaty signature on 14 April. Shevard-
nadze, seated alongside Shultz and the foreign ministers of Afghanistan
and Pakistan, carried out the task in Geneva. United Nations Secretary