336 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar attended. Soviet military disengage-
ment was finally agreed. On 18 April Shevardnadze put on a brave face
at the Politburo, claiming that the USSR’s withdrawal would bear no
resemblance to the way that the Americans had scuttled out of South
Vietnam. He added that the Americans were at last disbarred from
supplying arms through Pakistan. He was fantasizing. The Geneva
Accords did nothing to terminate the Afghan civil war. Fighting would
inevitably intensify, and the Soviet Army would trudge out of Afghan-
istan while America remained committed to assisting the mujahidin.
Shevardnadze was franker when he offered his bleak assessment of
condition of governance and economy throughout the country. He
made no attempt to suggest that things were likely to improve. One
day, Shevardnadze stated, the Politburo would have to admit in public
that the 1979 invasion had been a grievous mistake.^38
Gorbachëv and Shevardnadze unexpectedly came into conflict on
how to complete the withdrawal. For years there seemed nothing that
divided them on Afghan questions. But Shevardnadze was the only
Politburo member who was a frequent visitor to Kabul, and he had
come to like Najibullah. He hated the idea of abandoning the USSR’s
ally to his fate. This at least is what he told the Politburo. A few months
later he hinted about a different motive when he told an aide that he
feared for the cause of perestroika unless something was done to help
the Afghan government to survive.^39 He worried that the reformers
could soon pay a heavy political price for doing the right thing about
Afghanistan. He desired to make it impossible for the Soviet generals to
moan that the political leadership had let them down. This was some-
thing that could easily happen if ever the mujahidin should succeed in
overthrowing the Najibullah administration. An official enquiry might
well place the blame on the Politburo’s ascendant leadership. Shevard-
nadze hoped to obviate this possibility by leaving a military contingent
behind when the bulk of Soviet forces marched out.^40
Gorbachëv advocated a different approach and faced Shevard-
nadze down at the Politburo on 18 April. Since the beginning of 1987
he had warned against the possibility of what he called the ‘Vietnam-
ization’ of the Afghan imbroglio.^41 The Americans had kept their
forces for too long in South Vietnam and had suffered humiliation
as a result. He was determined to avoid such an outcome for the
Soviet Army. Now, when Shevardnadze urged the Politburo to keep
10–15,000 troops in Afghanistan, his patience evaporated and he
criticized the ‘hawk’s shriek’ of his political partner. A noisy debate