THE LEAVING OF AFGHANISTAN 337ensued. Kryuchkov stood up for Shevardnadze whereas Chebrikov
sided with Gorbachëv in demanding complete withdrawal. Gorbachëv
carried the day.^42
The General Staff proceeded efficiently with the logistics. When
Shevardnadze next visited Kabul, in August 1988, the Soviet Army
was close to withdrawing fifty per cent of its occupying forces. The
lingering worry was about the fate of the POWs in the hands of
the mujahidin. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked the Americans
to intercede.^43 Memories of the American exodus from Vietnam were
stirred. At the fall of Saigon in 1975, the Vietnamese communists had
used American prisoners – including their remains – as bargaining
tools. Now the USSR was discovering how hard such a situation could
be.^44 General Varennikov assured Shevardnadze that Soviet forces
would at least be leaving a stable Afghan government behind. General
Gromov, based in the south, provided a gloomier picture.^45 It was Gro-
mov’s report that convinced Shevardnadze, and he repeated his own
appeal for increased help for Najibullah’s administration. Varennikov
and others proposed to carry out a bombing offensive against the
mujahidin. The anticommunist leader Ahmed-Shah Masud was on
the point of cutting the main road from Kabul through to the USSR.
The supply line to Najibullah would soon be broken. Chernyaev
objected that bombing raids would achieve nothing unless accom-
panied by troops on the ground – and nobody in the Soviet leadership
wanted to re-invade (although Gorbachëv was in two minds for a
while).^46
The mujahidin were relentless. Najibullah’s prospects worsened
daily as the rebellion spread and the Afghan forces at his disposal
showed signs of demoralization. The Soviet General Staff concentrated
on the tasks of retreat. The priority was to leave with as few casualties
and as much dignity as possible. The schedule was set. By mid-
February 1989 no army or air force unit was to be left in Afghanistan.
Shevardnadze took yet another trip to Kabul in mid-January 1989
and witnessed the economic siege of the capital.^47 On his return to
Moscow he called again for the maintenance of a Soviet military
contingent. Najibullah had pleaded for a brigade to break the blockade
of Kandahar. On 23 January the Politburo’s Afghan Commission met
to hear from Shevardnadze. Others present included Yakovlev,
Chebrikov, Kryuchkov and Yazov.^48 Yakovlev asked for a ban on
bombers flying over Afghanistan from Soviet bases; he wanted to keep
public opinion around the world on the Kremlin’s side. Shevardnadze