338 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
retorted that the Najibullah administration was not doomed; he added
that the USSR would lose sympathy around the world if Soviet actions
led to that result.^49 Yakovlev rang Chernyaev begging him to intercede
with Gorbachëv, who proved to be worried about the growing rift with
Shevardnadze. A three-way phone call was arranged among Shevard-
nadze, Yakovlev and Chernyaev with Gorbachëv listening in to the
contending arguments. Chernyaev accused Shevardnadze of upsetting
the plan for withdrawal. Shevardnadze replied that Najibullah had
assured him that if he could last out the next year, he might survive
indefinitely. Gorbachëv consulted Kryuchkov, the KGB’s chief officer
for Afghanistan. Kryuchkov had recently spoken up for Shevardnadze.
Now he gave a grimmer account. What Gorbachëv heard quickly
removed any thought of sending a brigade.^50
On 15 February 1989 the last soldier of the USSR walked across
the bridge into Soviet Tajikistan. The war has lasted a few months
short of an entire decade. The attempt at communist revolution had
been accompanied by economic and educational reforms. There had
been a constant assault on local social traditions and Islam. The USSR’s
intervention had served to strengthen the resistance to the Afghan
communists. The experiment had been a lamentable failure.
Najibullah’s plight worsened as the mujahidin forces laid siege to
Jalalabad near the Pakistani border. If the city fell, the road would be
open for an assault on Kabul. On 9 March Najibullah pleaded for an
airborne bombing campaign undertaken from Soviet territory. When
the Politburo met next day, it turned down the request. Shevardnadze
expressed his distress on the grounds that it was a matter of honour
for him to stand by Najibullah.^51 (He did not mention his more acute
concern about the possibility of a future official enquiry.) At an emer-
gency session of the Politburo on 11 March, he repeated his arguments
against abandoning the USSR’s ‘friends’ in Afghanistan. Kryuchkov
gave him some support whereas Chebrikov hedged his bets; but
Yakovlev attacked any suggestion of sending Soviet troops back to help
Najibullah. Ligachëv was on a trip to Prague at that time and Ryzhkov
was visiting Siberia. Nevertheless the outcome was never in serious
doubt after Gorbachëv rebutted Shevardnadze. He denied that anyone
had ever assumed that Najibullah would be able to hold out. He
insisted on respect for the Geneva accords so long as he remained
General Secretary.^52 With this, the terrible Soviet military adventure
reached its conclusion. The Politburo had gone into Afghanistan reluc-
tantly but with confidence; it came out humbled.