340 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
Common Cause and the American Physical Society which denied the
possibility of constructing a perfect defensive system. Weinberger said
that this would scarcely matter if the system itself acted as an effective
deterrent. The other benefit would come from the ruinous costs
imposed on the Kremlin: ‘Without incentives to reduce armaments,
the Soviets will continue their build-up.’^4 He scoffed at the idea that the
Politburo had ‘a very deep commitment to democracy or freedom or
revulsion at communism’; he could hardly believe how Gorbachëv con-
tinued to appoint dreadful people to high office in the USSR.^5
His report to the American Congress in early 1987 rebuked those
senators and congressmen who gave priority to reducing the nation’s
financial deficit. Reneging on a lifelong commitment to fiscal recti-
tude, he contended that the greatest fraction of the current debt –
forty-two per cent – was held by American corporations which
would use their dividends to America’s economic benefit. The drive to
modernize the armed forces, including offensive weaponry, ought
to proceed with presidential approval.^6 He depicted the USSR as being
committed to ‘expansionism’ and world revolution.^7 He applauded the
Strategic Defense Initiative for having pulled the Soviet leadership
back into negotiations.^8 Weinberger implicitly denied that the pro-
gramme had exclusively pacific purposes. He wanted to turn America
into the dominant power over Europe. He criticized the Krasnoyarsk
radar station as an infringement of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; he
praised the upgrading work at America’s early-warning stations in
Thule and Fylingdales.^9 Weinberger distanced himself from the Reyk-
javik understandings about medium-range nuclear missiles. Under
questioning, he certainly affirmed his allegiance to Reagan’s objective
of their total elimination, but he did this in a way that left no doubt
about his private opinion.^10
The year 1987 brought discomfort to Weinberger as his efforts to
thwart Shultz and the State Department ran into the sand. Reagan had
made his definitive choice in policy, and Weinberger had lost his place
of preferment and had no realistic chance of regaining it. Proud and
exhausted, he tendered his resignation. He left his post on 23 Novem-
ber. The rumour went the rounds that he was leaving his post because
his wife had cancer. (This understandably upset Jane Weinberger, who
issued a public denial that this was the reason for his departure.)^11
Reagan gave a warm speech of thanks at the White House and Wein-
berger went into retirement. The relief felt in the State Department
was shared by the Politburo – Shevardnadze’s entourage celebrated the