SPOKES IN THE WHEEL 341departure of a man who had baulked every attempt at rapproche-
ment.^12 Weinberger stayed true to himself and told a reporter: ‘I think
it’s awfully early to conclude that [Gorbachëv] is a warm, caring, trust-
ing man who’s not going to do anything wrong. He’s got claws and
every once in a while those claws come out.’^13 In February 1988 he
appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and called
for vigilance against Soviet cheating and for protection of the Ameri-
can military budget and the Strategic Defense Initiative.^14
Weinberger was not the only leading official who stepped down.
Assistant Secretary Perle had left the Defense Department in June
1987; he had formed the opinion that he could influence foreign
policy more effectively outside the administration. He disliked the
concessions that were being mooted with the USSR. He hated the
spirit of compromise. In Perle’s opinion, it made no sense to hurry
towards signing a strategic arms treaty.^15 Whereas Weinberger contin-
ued to see little purpose and much danger in summit meetings, Perle
came to accept that they could at least be useful in grinding the Soviet
Union ‘into the ground’.^16 But Perle still insisted that the American
side had to bargain toughly; and as officials got ready to sign an Inter-
mediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty towards the end of that year,
he warned them not to count on his automatic support. He aimed to
keep his options open in the American media.^17 Nevertheless when
he examined the draft treaty, he proved willing to recommend it for
ratification.^18 This was also the position taken by former UN Ambas-
sador Jeane Kirkpatrick. The proposed treaty, she asserted, would
weaken Western Europe’s defences while making the USSR ‘somewhat
less vulnerable’; but she ended by endorsing its acceptance.^19
This still left people inside the administration who looked askance
at the rapprochement with the USSR. The CIA’s Fritz Ermath wrote to
Colin Powell: ‘The new Soviet leadership believes that it has a good
chance of getting its main goal with us, Détente Two, without funda-
mentally altering its policies in the Third World.’^20 Defense Secretary
Carlucci, speaking confidentially to leaders of American Jewish
organizations, declared: ‘Gorbachëv has bamboozled Europe. Image
of peace, compassion, but arms double talk.’^21 Fred Iklé, co-chair of
Reagan’s advisory commission on long-term defence strategy, asserted
that verification would remain impossible.^22
Conservative commentators ventilated their concerns. Among
them was Kissinger, who questioned whether the USSR had provided
reliable promises regarding American national security. He implied