SPOKES IN THE WHEEL 343now Reagan needed to quieten the angry bulls. Ill-tempered exchanges
between Washington and Moscow would be counterproductive.
The President did not yet look on things in quite this way when he
asked Carlucci, his National Security Adviser from December 1986, to
take the place that Weinberger was vacating at the Defense Depart-
ment. Carlucci had a jaundiced opinion about the proceedings in
Reykjavik.^30 Furthermore, he and Shultz had not always found it easy
to work with each other. Shultz took precautions. In the wake of the
‘Irangate’ affair he wanted no more backstairs diplomacy to which he
was not privy. He forbade US ambassadors to communicate with Car-
lucci unless they had either obtained his sanction or at least informed
him in advance.^31 But Shultz also wanted to mend fences with Carlucci
and invited him to spend a couple of days at his Stanford home, where
they talked over breakfast about how they would work together. Shultz
included Colin Powell, newly appointed as National Security Adviser
in Carlucci’s place, in the house party. Powell was unusual not only as
the first African-American to hold this post but also in his diplomatic
skills – he was known as a ‘people person’, good at preventing conflict.
Shultz thought him incomparably better than any of his predecessors.
At last there was a chance of some harmony in Washington when the
arms talks were under discussion.^32
When appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on
12 November 1987, Carlucci offered to reduce the number of pro-
grammes of research and production with a view towards making at
least some of them operational. The defence budget had been frozen in
real terms for two years. Carlucci was hoping to improve the relation-
ship with Congress. He admitted that he had yet to be convinced that
the Strategic Defense Initiative would ever prove cost-effective. Com-
mittee Chairman and Democrat Sam Nunn welcomed the contrast
with Weinberger’s stridency and lack of candour.^33 Carlucci at the same
time wanted the President to talk to people outside the administration
with experience of negotiating with Soviet leaders. (Was he quietly
trying to dilute Shultz’s influence? So much for the Stanford breakfast
accord.) Reagan disliked the idea of consulting Perle or former National
Security Adviser Brzezinski, perhaps because he thought that anti-Sovi-
etism was too ingrained in them. He preferred to meet former President
Nixon, despite their past and current disagreements. The historical
legacy of Watergate meant that Nixon had to be smuggled into the
White House so that no reporter knew what was going on. A helicopter
landed on the south lawn with him on board.^34