344 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
Gorbachëv, of course, had no concerns about the kind of publicity
that Reagan wished to avoid. On the inside of the USSR’s institutions,
however, it was becoming a different matter. The armed forces were an
epicentre of discontent – Shevardnadze quipped that the difficulties in
the arms talks were not with the Americans but with the lobbies on
the Soviet side.^35 Gorbachëv had always been sensitive to this. When
preparing for a Politburo meeting on 28 September 1987, he drew
comfort from the army leadership’s acceptance of the new military
doctrine and was delighted about his conversations with Defence
Minister Yazov. He appreciated the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’
adaptiveness under Shevardnadze. He was aware that the KGB was
conducting its own internal debate about perestroika; but Gorbachëv
liked the fact that the agency contained ‘intellectual people’: he trusted
it to remain helpful and dutiful. He claimed to enjoy his discussions
with Chairman Chebrikov.^36
The Law on the State Enterprise came into effect in January 1988.
Its main intent was to liberate the planned economy by loosening the
central shackles on industrial and commercial operations. Factory
directors were empowered to set their own prices for the goods being
produced. Their workers acquired the right to elect them – Gorbachëv
aspired to establishing conditions of labour democracy. His aim was to
re-energize the USSR’s industrial performance just as he had done to
change the political environment through the reforms he had intro-
duced at the January 1987 Central Committee plenum. He believed
that he was liberating the vast potential of the Marxist-Leninist social
order. He and fellow reformers concentrated on changing conditions
in the Soviet Union, and many of them expected the country to
narrow the technological gaps between the USSR and the West. As yet
the emphasis was on internal transformation and the external compli-
cations about the grain purchase agreement, CoCom and industrial
espionage were ignored. The reason for the neglect was mainly politi-
cal: Gorbachëv wanted to focus on what was quickly practical. In the
longer term, he knew he could count on Prime Minister Ryzhkov’s
support in altering economic links with Western capitalist countries.
Ryzhkov was telling foreigners that two of his ultimate ambitions were
to reduce the Soviet defence budget and obtain the USSR’s entry into
the International Monetary Fund.^37 This could only be a long way
ahead. For the foreseeable future, the USSR had to cope on its own.
Gorbachëv pushed forward with his foreign policy despite some
disturbing signals from Washington. In January 1988 a commission