346 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
Gorbachëv made further enquiries, Pravda editor Ivan Frolov dropped
a strong hint about Ligachëv; but Gorbachëv refrained from asking
Frolov to be explicit. He judged that he could not yet afford to fall out
with Ligachëv.^40 He had reason to be cautious. Gromyko, Solomentsev
and Vorotnikov agreed with Ligachëv that Andreeva had written a
good letter; and Gorbachëv had to go to the Politburo to secure the
rejection of any such piece again. Yakovlev, Ryzhkov and Shevard-
nadze took Gorbachëv’s side; even Chebrikov and Yazov did.^41
Gorbachëv went on appointing reformers to leading posts in
foreign policy. In spring 1988 he removed Dobrynin from the Party
International Department and appointed Yakovlev to oversee it. Dobrynin
had failed to turn the department into a dynamic alternative ‘think
tank’ on global problems – he always appeared preoccupied with
America, where he had served as Ambassador.^42 Gorbachëv wanted a
practical radical, and Yakovlev fitted this requirement.^43 Having
poached Chernyaev and Shakhnazarov from the International Depart-
ment as his advisers, Gorbachëv also continued to rely on them for
ideas on foreign policy.^44 Chernyaev said they provided him with only
‘a semi-manufactured product’: Gorbachëv alone took responsibility
for the finished article.^45
For technical advice about nuclear arms reduction, he continued
to look to Zaikov and the Big Five and relied heavily on their recom-
mended guidelines for each round of high-level talks.^46 Such was his
confidence in Zaikov that he made him Moscow City Party secretary
after Yeltsin’s removal in November 1987. Zaikov was renowned as
someone who put out political fires, and Gorbachëv asked him to put
them out throughout the party hierarchy of the capital. Gorbachëv
underestimated the effect of the additional burden he was placing
upon Zaikov.^47 Running Moscow was an enormous job and Zaikov
already had his hands full with his duties in the Politburo and the
Big Five. His problems with the General Staff had always existed and
compromise was reached with difficulty. Zaikov, never the greatest en-
thusiast for perestroika, was made daily aware that the reformers could
not take their ascendancy for granted. He pointed to the obstacles that
people from the Soviet military-industrial complex were laying in his
path. He called for the party leadership and government to help him
out – and at the same time he was being expected to oversee public
affairs in the Soviet metropolis.^48
Gorbachëv made things worse by appointing Valeri Boldin, his
own personal assistant, to take over the Party General Department.