352 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
a free and fair fashion. Yeltsin made an appearance and pleaded for
readmission to party life. Gorbachëv, wanting to have a counterweight
against his own communist-conservative opponents, allowed the
request. The plan was to hold elections in March 1989 and for
the Congress of People’s Deputies – as well as its inner body, the USSR
Supreme Soviet – to remain in almost permanent session. The days of
mere ceremonialism and quasi-parliamentarianism were coming to a
close. This would be a constitutional revolution, astonishing as it was
unprecedented in Soviet history. Gorbachëv had the bit between his
teeth and was racing to the line.
On 15 July he was full of confidence when addressing a meeting of
the Warsaw Pact’s political leaders. He announced a new stage in
world politics. The Soviet promise to withdraw from Afghanistan, he
claimed, was serving to unblock the resolution of other regional con-
flicts. Links with America had never been closer.^2 He admitted that the
American political right continued to advocate a policy of armed force
and technological embargo. But their denunciations of the USSR, in
his estimation, were evidence of the strength of perestroika. Right-
wing politicians and columnists feared that ‘socialism’ might succeed
in reforming itself in the East. According to Gorbachëv, they could see
that Western capitalism would eventually face serious competition,
even if this might require another couple of decades before it came to
fulfilment. He anyway doubted that the American political right
would be able to change opinion in the White House. He forecast that
the rapprochement with America would outlast Reagan’s departure
from office. He stated this baldly, without explaining his reasoning. He
asked the East European leaders to take his word for it that whoever
won the presidential election would want friendly relations with the
USSR.^3
He spoke robustly about the irreversibility of Europe’s division into
two political halves; but at the same time he laid stress on the need to
change the way that the Warsaw Pact operated. He told the East Euro-
pean leaders that he would have no worries if they strengthened their
links with the European Economic Community.^4 Gorbachëv told them
that things had changed since 1985. As far as he was concerned, they
now had the freedom to negotiate as independent states. He expressly
denied that West Germany was any kind of threat – indeed, he
depicted Kohl as having an approach to foreign policy close to his
own. Eastern European communist leaders were used to saying and
hearing that Kohl was a danger to stability across the continent. Ever