REAGAN’S WINDOW OF DEPARTURE 355any such barrier. He dreamed of creating a sensation. He would take
the American political establishment by storm. Having presented his
thoughts to the USSR Defence Council, he went to the Politburo and
said: ‘It’s a serious matter. The Americans are scared that we might do
something as in the spirit of Reykjavik . . . We’ll push forward our
internal and external politics – and there’ll be nowhere for Bush to
turn.’^14 He enjoined strict secrecy on everybody: ‘We’ll get rid of
anyone who leaks and deprive them of their posts and privileges.’ He
was plotting to surprise the General Assembly by announcing a uni-
lateral reduction of Soviet troops by 500,000. He would deny that such
concessions derived from the pursuit of Western economic assistance.
The dazzling occasion would be an opportunity for him to avow his
confidence in the Soviet future.^15
Shevardnadze urged Gorbachëv to be even more radical by with-
drawing all Soviet forces from Hungary. This was too much for
Gorbachëv, who agreed on the desirability of reducing the military
presence but rejected immediate total withdrawal.^16 Shevardnadze had
also been nagging him to put questions of human rights at the top of
the Politburo’s agenda: ‘It’s a great cause!’ He wanted the Soviet leader-
ship to endorse the United Nations as a ‘universal organization’,
seemingly with authority over the USSR and the USA.^17 Gorbachëv
demurred. His own ideas were a massive break with the USSR’s tradi-
tions; he felt he was going as far and as fast as he safely could. He did,
though, accept Shevardnadze’s proposal to commit the USSR to what
he called the ‘zero option’ in political prisoners and refuseniks. He
agreed that the country should no longer have any of them. Shevard-
nadze had also called for the complete removal of restrictions on
leaving or entering the Soviet Union. Once Gorbachëv had shown it
to the rest of the leadership, he received strong objections from the
security agencies. He thought it unwise to annoy the KGB unduly and
trimmed back the proposal. Even so, he retained an advocacy of the
right of any citizen to emigrate so long as they were not in possession
of state secrets.^18
He discussed the draft with the Soviet delegation that accompa-
nied him to New York. It was a motley group including Shevardnadze,
Yakovlev and other members of the foreign-policy establishment.
Raisa was among them. The Soviet creative intelligentsia was also rep-
resented – film directors Tengiz Abuladze and Mark Zakharov were
with him. The atmosphere was entirely positive. Ambassador Dubinin