REAGAN’S WINDOW OF DEPARTURE 357what had been accomplished by Gorbachëv and Reagan; he also inti-
mated his wish to promote James Baker and Brent Scowcroft to high
posts in his administration. The meeting ended after Reagan recalled
fondly how he had told Gorbachëv at the Geneva summit that the two
of them had the capacity to start the next world war or bring peace to
the world. He was pleased that it was peace that they had chosen.^24
Bush talked by phone with Gorbachëv next morning, shortly
before the Russians left for Moscow. While looking forward to work-
ing constructively together, he issued an alert that he would take his
time about this.^25 Shultz had told Shevardnadze the same thing; he
had also warned him that the Soviet leaders had to do much more
about human rights if they wanted further agreements with America
- Shevardnadze continued to hope that he was wrong.^26
Shultz did what he could to finish off his current business with the
USSR. The sudden departure of the Soviet delegation for Moscow had
left him unable to agree progress on the Vienna talks about European
security and cooperation. If Gorbachëv cooperated, it might just be
possible to secure an agreement before he and Reagan stepped down.
He asked Ambassador Matlock to explain this to Shevardnadze, who
welcomed the approach.^27 A few details remained for elaboration.
Human rights in particular continued to divide the two sides, despite
everything that Gorbachëv had promised in his New York speech.
Shevardnadze delegated the negotiating role to Anatoli Adamishin
while Shultz appointed Richard Schifter to represent the State Depart-
ment. These two officials gave impetus to the search for common
ground, and Shultz judged that the USSR had moved close enough to
satisfying American demands for him to recommend the adoption of
the ‘concluding document’ of the Conference on Security and Cooper-
ation in Europe. He crossed the Atlantic to witness the act of signature
on 17 January 1989.^28 Among the outcomes of this agreement was a
commitment by America and the Soviet Union to start discussions
about conventional forces in Europe within the next seven weeks. The
idea was to effect a drastic reduction of such forces in the countries of
NATO and the Warsaw Pact.^29
At the Politburo sessions to review the recent events, starting on
27 December 1988, Gorbachëv put his New York visit above the
Armenian earthquake on the agenda. He was proud of the impact he
had made and declared: ‘We want and propose to build a new world,
new relations.’^30 He denied that an eagerness to end the Cold War
signified a desire to move away from socialist objectives, and he