358 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
noticeably failed to refer to the de-ideologizing of international rela-
tions or of universal human values. He claimed that American liberals
welcomed his programme of socialist renewal whereas the Heritage
Foundation and other organizations on the American political right
called for the maintenance of direct pressure on the USSR.^31 There was
uncertainty about how Bush would turn out as President, and Gor-
bachëv emphasized that Bush had a deserved reputation for ‘natural
caution’. Bush had also defined himself as ‘a centrist’. Unfortunately
this meant that he could not act as freely as Reagan, who had enjoyed
the advantage of being trusted by the American political right. But
Gorbachëv was optimistic about being able to come to terms with
Bush; he indicated that Shevardnadze should arrange to meet the new
Secretary of State James Baker as soon as possible.^32
Prime Minister Ryzhkov disliked the press coverage around the
world about the New York speech. He asked for the media to explain
that the Politburo was not retreating from socialism but rather from a
distorted version of it; he also warned that the process of integration
with the world economy contained possible pitfalls.^33 Gorbachëv
changed the subject and regaled the Politburo with an account of his
ecstatic reception by New Yorkers – he evidently felt that Ryzhkov had
stinted the praise that was due to him.^34
Shevardnadze was more expansive in his congratulations. Ameri-
can popular opinion, he predicted, would compel the Bush admini-
stration to continue with Reagan’s policy of conciliation with the USSR.
He asked the Politburo to sanction initiatives on strategic nuclear mis-
siles, on chemical weapons and on human rights. He noted that he
himself had come under criticism for having failed to liaise with the
Defence Ministry about the latest variant of the policy to withdraw
Soviet armed forces from Eastern Europe. Shevardnadze rejected the
accusation as groundless. He also objected to Yazov’s attempt to restrict
the information about the Defence Ministry’s practical plan; he said
that Moscow had to show to the world that it was serious about chang-
ing the Soviet military posture to defensive requirements alone.^35 In the
same combative fashion he put the case for deepening the USSR’s
cooperation with America. He rebuked the Leningrad Party secretary
Yuri Solovëv for inspiring a local radio broadcast about the subversive
activities of ‘imperialist spy agencies’. He said that such behaviour
played into the hands of people like Kissinger. If the Politburo wished
to make progress in its talks with Washington, care had to be taken to
avoid giving unnecessary offence.^36