The End of the Cold War. 1985-1991

(Sean Pound) #1
REAGAN’S WINDOW OF DEPARTURE 359

Yakovlev spoke in a similar vein. While expecting the political
right to make difficulties for Bush, he reported US Ambassador Mat-
lock as regarding the incoming President as more professional and
better informed than his predecessor. Yakovlev asked the Politburo to
appreciate the advance that had been achieved. He reasoned that
America no longer dominated the agenda. There was a growth in con-
cern among American leaders about Europe and the Pacific as zones
where Soviet foreign policy might get the better of them. Yakovlev
expressed his delight: ‘[The Americans] have not wanted to jump on to
a train already in motion, far less on to one that is moving into the
distance. They are used to being the drivers. The activation of our for-
eign policy in other regions very much worries them.’^37 He commended
Gorbachëv for doing so much to rid the country of its ‘enemy image’
around the world. He ridiculed the Marxist-Leninist tenet that ‘capi-
talists care less about people’s needs’. He spoke angrily about the
inaccuracies in the press about the Soviet economy; he expressed his
exasperation about the ineptitude of the USSR’s trade officials. Yakov-
lev insisted that the only way forward was to deepen the process of
reform. Much had been done, but more was still needed.^38
All this made Yazov feel somewhat uncomfortable. He reported on
unease in the armed forces about the potential damage to the USSR’s
security. He admitted to refusing to supply the Supreme Soviet with
his plan of withdrawal from Eastern Europe; but he promised to
release it to the Defence Council.^39 Gorbachëv could see that Yazov
was trying to compromise. He eased the situation by commenting that
if the Americans kept secrets, why shouldn’t the USSR. Yazov immedi-
ately calmed down and announced that three entire divisions were
scheduled to leave Eastern Europe in 1989.^40 Gorbachëv expressed
sympathy for the difficulties involved in having to reduce the officer
corps by 100,000. Shevardnadze, Zaikov, Yakovlev, Yazov and Chair-
man of the State Foreign Economic Commission Vladimir Kamentsev
were asked to draft a suitable policy for the Politburo.^41 Ligachëv
proved harder to placate than Yazov. He insisted that the ‘class charac-
ter’ of international relations should not be relegated to oblivion.
Essentially he was warning against straying away from Marxism-
Leninism.^42 It is true that he praised the emphasis on disarmament.
But he also noted that provincial party leaders were querying the path
of current internal policy. He claimed that the new economic freedom
for cooperatives had led to instances of greedy speculation. Though

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